Raymond P. L. Cannefax and Deborah Cannefax v. Donald W. Clement and Ruth L. Clement: Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1990
Raymond P. L. Cannefax and Deborah Cannefax v.
Donald W. Clement and Ruth L. Clement: Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Rodney M. Pipella; Attorney for Respondents.
Steven H. Lybbert; Attorney for Petitioners.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Cannefax v. Clement, No. 900084.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2871
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
KFU 
45.9 
•S9 
DOCKET NO 
BRIEF 
teem 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RAYMOND P. L. CANNEFAX and ] 
DEBRA CANNEFAX, ] 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v s . ] 
DONALD W. CLEMENT and RUTH ] 
L. CLEMENT, ] 
Defendants and Petitioners ] 
i Case No. 900084 
I Priority No. 14 
PETITIONERS1 BRIEF 
Petition for Certiorari 
Having Been Granted on May 21, 1990 
From An Order of the Utah Court of Appeals 
Entered on February 2, 1990 
RODNEY M. PIPELLA 
648 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Respondents 
STEVEN H. LYBBERT 
820 Kearns Building 
136 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Petitioners 
I B me&r 
JUL 1 8 l^H 
Clerk, Supreme Court Utah 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RAYMOND P. L. CANNEFAX and ] 
DEBRA CANNEFAX, ] 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, ] 
vs, ] 
DONALD W. CLEMENT and RUTH ] 
L. CLEMENT, ] 
Defendants and Petitioners ] 
i Case No. 900084 
1 Priority No. 14 
PETITIONERS1 BRIEF 
Petition for Certiorari 
Having Been Granted on May 21, 1990 
From An Order of the Utah Court of Appeals 
Entered on February 2, 1990 
STEVEN H. LYBBERT 
820 Kearns Building 
136 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Petitioners 
RODNEY M. PIPELLA 
648 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Respondents 
LIST OF ALL PARTIES 
All parties to the proceeding in the trial court and in the 
Utah Court of Appeals are listed in the caption on the cover page 
of this brief* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 1 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT . 3 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW . 3 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT . . . . . . 7 
ARGUMENT 9 
A. THE INTEREST OF A VENDOR OF LANDS CONTRACTED TO 
BE SOLD IS BOUND BY THE LIEN OF A JUDGMENT 
AGAINST HIM IF THE CONTRACT IS EXECUTORY WHEN 
THE LIEN ATTACHES, TO THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE 
CONTRACT IS UNEXECUTED 9 
B. THE CASES RELIED UPON BY THE UTAH COURT OF 
APPEALS WHICH DISCUSS THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE 
CONVERSION DO NOT SUPPORT THE PROPOSITION THAT 
THE DOCTRINE MUST BE APPLIED IN ALL CASES OR IN 
THIS CASE IN PARTICULAR 17 
C. LACH V. DESERET BANK WAS ERRONEOUSLY DECIDED 
AND SHOULD BE OVERRULED 19 
1. The Lach Discussion on Equitable Conversion 
is Dicta 19 
2. Lach Conflicts With Butler v. Wilkinson . . 20 
3. The Cases Cited in the Lach Discussion of 
Equitable Conversion Do Not Compel the 
Conclusion Reached by the Court of Appeals . 20 
D. THERE ARE NO EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS IN THIS 
CASE THAT WOULD PRECLUDE THE CLEMENTS1 
JUDGMENT LIEN FROM ATTACHING TO THEIR 
DEBTORS1 REMAINING INTEREST IN THE LOCKHART 
ROAD PROPERTY 21 
E. THIS COURT SHOULD HOLD THAT BOTH THE VENDEE 
AND VENDOR OF PROPERTY BEING SOLD ON CONTRACT 
HAVE AN OWNERSHIP INTEREST WHICH MAY BE 
SUBJECT TO THE LIEN OF A JUDGMENT 24 
F. THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER THE ADDITIONAL 
PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS RAISED IN JUDGE 
BULLOCK1S DISSENTING OPINION IN THE COURT OF 
APPEALS 27 
CONCLUSION 27 
ADDENDUM 28 
1. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-22-1 
2. STIPULATED FACTS 
3. REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS [ON DEFENDANTS 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT] 
4. ORDER AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
5. OPINION, INCLUDING THE CONCURRING AND DISSENTING 
OPINIONS, DELIVERED BY THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Allred v. Allred, 15 Utah 2d 396, 393 P.2d 791 
(1964) . . . . 17, 21 
Belnap v. Blain, 575 P.2d 696 (Utah 1978) 21 
Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 
1987) 11, 12, 19, 20, 24, 26 
Cannefax v. Clement, 786 P.2d 1377 (Utah App. 1990) . . . 23, 27 
Cascade Sec. Bank v. Butler, 567 P.2d 631 (Wash. 1977) . 24, 25 
First Security Bank v. Rogers, 429 P.2d 386 (Idaho 
1967) 12, 25 
Fridley v. Munson, 194 N.W. 840 (S.D. 1923) . . . . . . . . . 25 
Fulton v. Duro, 700 P.2d 14 (Idaho 1985) . . . . . 25 
Gray v. Stevens, 5 Utah 2d 361, 302 P.2d 273 (1956) 22 
Heath v. Dodson, 110 P.2d 845 (Wash. 1941) 12, 24, 25 
Heider v. Dietz, 380 P.2d 619 (Or. 1963) 14 
In re Estate of Willson, 28 Utah 2d 197, 499 P.2d 1298 
(1972) 17, 21 
Jelco, Incorporated v. Third Judicial District Court, 
29 Utah 2d 472, 511 P.2d 739 (1973) . 18, 21 
Lach v. Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802 (Utah App. 1987) . 17, 19, 20 
Lang v. Klinger, 34 Cal.App.3d 987, 110 Cal.Rptr. 532 
(1973) . . . 12 
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988) 4 
May v. Emerson, 96 P. 454 (Or. 1908) . . . . . 12, 13 
Monroe v. Lincoln City Emp. Credit Union, 279 N.W.2d 866 
(Neb. 1979) 12, 14 
Mooring v. Brown, 763 F.2d 386 (10th Cir. 1985) . . . . . 12, 15 
Reynolds v. Van Wagoner, 592 P.2d 593 (Utah 1979) 18 
Sacramento Baseball Club, Inc. v. Great Northern Baseball 
Co., 748 P.2d 1058 (Utah 1987) . . . . . . 4 1
Scoular Grain Co. v. Pioneer Valley Sav. Bank, 447 N.W.2d 
38 (Neb. 1989) 12, 15 
Uffenheimer v. Rob Con Enterprises, Inc., 425 N.Y.S.2d 856 
(1980) 12, 16 
Yarnall v. First Nat. Bank of Stillwater, 74 B.R. 3 
(D.S.D. 1986) 12 
STATUTES AND COURT RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 12, 21 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 69(e)(3) 26 
MISCELLANEOUS CITATIONS 
27 Am Jur 2d Equitable Conversion, § 1, p. 483 10 
27 Am Jur 2d Equitable Conversion, § 3, pp. 485-486 10 
46 Am Jur 2d Judgments § 266, p. 483 10 
Pound, The Progress of the Law 1918-1919, 33 Harv.L.Rev. 
813 (1920) 13 
2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This action is before this court upon Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari from an order and judgment of the Utah Court of 
Appeals entered on February 2, 1990. The Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari was granted on May 21, 1990. 
This court has appellate jurisdiction over a judgment of the 
Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The question presented in this quiet title action is as 
follows: Does a judgment lien pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-22-1 attach to the retained legal title of a judgment debtor 
who has sold real property under a contract of sale prior to 
docketing of the judgment, when there is still a balance owing to 
the judgment debtor by the contract vendee? 
The Utah Court of Appeals held that pursuant to the doctrine 
of equitable conversion, the seller!s retained legal title to 
real property under an executory land sale contract is personal 
property rather than real property, so that no judgment lien can 
attach to the seller's interest. Petitioners maintain that 
equitable conversion is an equitable doctrine that is applied 
only when necessary, and only to the extent necessary, to do 
equity. Accordingly, it should be held that a judgment lien does 
attach against a vendor's retained legal title, although it may 
be subject to equities in favor of third parties upon competent 
proof of those equities. 
This case was decided in the trial court (and in the Utah 
Court of Appeals) on stipulated facts. Therefore, this court may 
3 
sustain the Utah Court of Appeals' decision only if convinced of 
its correctness. Seef Sacramento Baseball Club/ Inc. v. Great 
Northern Baseball Co./ 748 P.2d 1058, 1060 (Utah 1987). Since 
the issue is solely one of law, this court need not defer to the 
Utah Court of Appeals1 decision. See, Madsen v. Borthick/ 769 
P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1: 
"From the time the judgment of the district court or circuit 
court is docketed and filed in the office of the clerk of the 
district court of the county it becomes a lien upon all the real 
property of the judgment debtor/ not exempt from execution/ in 
the county in which the judgment is entered/ owned by him at the 
time or by him thereafter acquired during the existence of said 
i • „1 
lien. . . . " 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was commenced when the Clements, who were the 
judgment creditors of George W. Barker Jr. and Lila M. Barker, 
obtained a writ of execution against real property located in 
Salt Lake County owned by the Cannefaxes. The Barkers had 
previously owned the property. The Cannefaxes brought the action 
against the Clements to quiet title to the property and to 
restrain the Salt Lake County Sheriff from executing on the 
judgment lien which the Clements contended they had against the 
1. The entire statute is quoted in the Addendum to this 
Respondents' Brief. 
4 
property. The Clements counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment 
that they were the holders of a judgment lien against the 
property which was superior to the Cannefaxes1 interest. 
The Clements moved for summary judgment upon stipulated 
facts [R. 106-108]/ a copy of which is contained in the addendum 
to this brief. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor 
of the Clements/ holding that the lien of their judgment against 
the Cannefaxes1 predecessor in interest (the Barkers) attached to 
the real property to the extent of the unpaid balance under a 
prior long term contract for the sale of the property. 
The Cannefaxes appealed. In a majority opinion the Utah 
Court of Appeals held that pursuant to the doctrine of equitable 
conversion the retained legal title of a vendor under an 
executory land sale contract is personal property rather than 
real property and no judgment can attach thereto under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-22-1. The Court of Appeals reversed the summary 
judgment granted in favor of the Clements and ordered the trial 
court to enter summary judgment in favor of the Cannefaxes. 
The Clements petitioned this court for a writ of certiorari 
and that petition was granted on May 21/ 1990. 
The facts upon which this case must be determined are not 
disputed and were presented to the trial court by means of a 
2 
written stipulation. [R. 106-108]. 
2. The original Stipulated Facts do not appear to be in the 
court file. However/ a copy signed by counsel for respondents is 
at R. 105-108 and a copy signed by counsel for each side is 
included in the addendum to this brief. 
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In 1981 George W. Barker Jr. and Lila M. Barker were fee 
simple owners of the subject real property on Lockhart Road in 
Salt Lake County ("the Lockhart Road property") (R. 106). The 
property was subject to mortgage loan obligations in favor of 
Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association and Continental 
Bank & Trust Company. (R. 106). In 1981 the Barkers entered 
into a Uniform Real Estate Contract to sell the Lockhart Road 
property to Diane Hodge for $160/000/ payable $40/000 down and 
the balance over a period of time with interest. (R. 106). Ms. 
Hodge caused a Notice of Contract to be recorded with the Salt 
Lake County Recorder. (R. 106). 
In 1985 the Clements obtained a judgment in the Seventh 
Judicial District Court of Uintah County against the Barkers in 
the amount of $70,526.00. (R. 106). The judgment was duly 
docketed with the clerk of the Third Judicial District Court of 
Salt Lake County. (R. 106). The judgment was not appealed. (R. 
106) . 
In September 1985/ one month after the Clements1 judgment 
was docketed in Salt Lake County, the Barkers/ Diane Hodge/ and 
the Cannefaxes entered into a two-way transaction with respect to 
the Lockhart Road property. At that time Hodge owed a balance of 
$87/747.40 on her Uniform Real Estate contract and the prior 
obligations to Prudential and Continental totaled $33/282.50. 
(R. 107). In the transaction/ the obligations in favor of 
Prudential and Continental were satisfied/ the Barkers gave Hodge 
a credit of $9,464.94, and Hodge paid the Barkers $45,000.00. 
The Barkers then executed a warranty deed in favor of Hodge. 
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Hodge then executed a warranty deed In favor of the Cannefaxes. 
(R "'\-* ' 'M-.-,c- i^- J *•-. _ jraea, a cicie s e a m 
condu,*ter, >
 r . J,.. .^Lt I <sr.ieiii a-vii.' <i:pt"Y T^^e Aqency. d w.:_jseci 
the Meme: H^J ludgment agains" the ^ar. er - . 
the Thir*- Judicial Diytfi^t . m i * ., ^  , u. -» «.i^ .i Ln„ J.emeuts' 
judgment was docketed in ^a. i Lake • ? J u . *- y created d . le i 
t 1 *- < ' '-: •- i 
t h e U n i f ., . .': h - ' i j i u o l - d i t f J w i i J. i. JI C L D t : .« * c: c • > . i -: Ji d L A t ; L" is d o - . i « 
Hodge as of September 2S , 1985 ( t h e 1a*^ l iodge r e c e i v e d a 
w -: ^ -i n • - : -.rker: s ai: id ga : e a 
C a n n e f a x e s i > i e s s trie dmwuip. ,L ,. ,L •,. --
 t au ib rances 
of P r u d e n t i a l &.> : r o n t i n e n t a i * •* ' r>e judgment K ^ - t- ~ 
t r- •• '« < > , < * : • * • : 
Summary ' judgment wdo e n t e r e d .J ; iv ^t * , - ^(DeuL^ a .^ ^ : a . n s t 
t h e C a n n e f a x e s r . a n n e f a x e s c o n o i %\nl * 
S U M M A R Y 0 F A R G U M E N T 
The genera1 ru1e / whIch shouJ d be recognized in Utah/ is 
that the interest of a vendor ii i lands contracted to be sold is 
b . . : ; . . 
unexecuted i. ^ l u K uit.^.,iej. in order t~ adoi :. ::r,e 
general . ,.e m i s ojurt need only cecoqni zed that "rhc /e-i 
property ui crie - :aieriL debtor . . .•-*/-.. as referred 
to . , :t^h«s iudgni^^t Tien statute- ] - i™^1-i, includes 
the legal interest ii i real property retained i;y a contract 
vendor / as we] ] as 1:1: te eqi iitab] e i i Itere st • * 'i^  .\" i: act 
vendee. 
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The Cannefaxes1 and the Utah Court of Appeals1 reliance on 
the doctrine of equitable conversion is misplaced because that 
doctrine is only applied by courts when it is equitable that it 
be applied. In this case/ there are no such equities that would 
require the court to resort to a fiction and find that the legal 
titleholder of real property does not "own" the property. The 
Cannefaxes1 agent had actual notice of the judgment against the 
Barkers prior to recording the deed from the Barkers to Hodge and 
the deed from Hodge to the Cannefaxes/ but chose to proceed to 
record those deeds and bind title insurance on the property. 
Thus/ the equities of the transaction favor the Clements. 
Application of the doctrine of equitable conversion will benefit 
only the title company. 
To mechanically apply the doctrine of equitable conversion 
to cases where a judgment debtor has sold his real property on 
contract but retains legal title/ serves only to convert an 
equitable doctrine into a legal doctrine of universal application 
without regard to the equities. 
Finally/ application of the doctrine of equitable conversion 
limits the effect of Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1 which states in 
broad and inclusive terms that upon being properly docketed a 
judgment "becomes a lien upon all the real property of the 
judgment debtor . . . owned by him." In order to give effect to 
the broad language of the statute/ and to avoid the uncertainty 
that comes with application of an equitable doctrine/ this court 
need only find that when property has been sold on contract/ 
which contract is executory/ both the vendor and vendee have an 
8 
"ownership1 1 I n t e r e s t / e i t h e r of whIch i n t e r e s t s may beeome 
SJL/- ' , - 2 
easily determined oy teitLyuM. i ^ ^ !«.,-.!*; -,^L., .:IUCJ ; ^ ""he 
contract at trie ::..:•. i..e judqnent • i^n aLLa_:ie^ „ ::ie
 rroperLy. 
ARGUMENT 
A, 
THE INTEREST OF A VENDOR OF LANDS CONTRACTED TO BE SOI E 
IS BOUND BY THE LIEN OF A JUDGMENT AGAINST HIM 
IF THE CONTRACT IS EXECUTORY WHEN THE LIEN ATTACHES, 
TO THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE CONTRACT IS UNEXECUTED 
Utah Code AJ,.' I-^J-J provides : r oad and inclusive 
terms that 3 properly dockete^ "udgment becomes a lien pen all 
O' \ ' ' . -z- - , . I 3 
d o c k e t e d w h i c h is owned or 1; n r e a t t e r a c q u i r e d oy :re 1 a d g m e n t 
d e b t o r d'.ir : no r ^ ' ^ ^ f o n •£» * t-k>,~, .^. v, . I S S I J ? ^ "• 1 ? ~ ise 
i s w • - i . - 3 1 
of their judgment debtors , 1- Lockhart Roao property even 
thouqh the Judgment debt"- * h i — "*' ra ~*~ac to seLi cue ^ - p ^ - ^ 
pr J C : is c x e t i o : ; •;- • , *
 r - "\ounty 
resolution of that issue hinges ie sinipi e determination 
whether 1 -or* roo^t .^~^~r* - - *-r.-rr- ,^ * • '-. makes him or her 
a ,. v, : <- ,_ 
T h e C l e m e n t s 3.,so,]-,1 £ ** -;: . judgment ien did attach to 
the Lockhart Road property to the extent that Diane Hodge/ the 
c o n t t:: a c t • e 1: 1 d e e , s t :i II ] :) w e d 11: 1 s j u d g in e 1 11 <::i e t • t :: 1 : s • :: 1 1 11: 1 e I : 
Real Estate Contract/ i e , , $ 54,4 64.9 0 ($ 8 7,7 4 7.4 0 1 ess the 
$33/282.50 owed by the Barkers to Prudentia 1 and Continenta 1 ). 
H o w e "i 7 e 1 : / i 1: 1 :i t: s < i e c i s i D 1: 1 1:1: 1 e I J t: a 1 1 C o 1 11: !: • : f 1 \, p p e a 1 s I* 1 e ] d 11: 1 a t 
pursuant to the doctr ine of equitab1e conversion the 1ega1 ti11e 
to real property retained by the vendor under an executory land 
sale contract is not real property to which a judgment lien can 
attach. This conclusion is contrary to the general rule with 
respect to the doctrine of equitable conversion. That doctrine 
has been described thusly: 
"Equitable conversion is that constructive alteration 
in the nature or character of property whereby, in equity/ 
real estate is for certain purposes considered as 
personalty/ or whereby personalty/ for similar considera-
tions/ is regarded as real estate/ and in either instance/ 
it is deemed to be transmissable and descendible in its 
converted form. The doctrine of equitable conversion was 
adopted for the purpose of giving effect to the intention of 
the testator/ settlor/ or contracting parties/ and is not a 
fixed rule of law but proceeds on equitable principles that 
take into account the result to be accomplished. It is a 
mere fiction/ resting on the principle that equity regards 
things which are directed to be done as having actually been 
done where nothing has intervened which ought to prevent 
performance." 27 Am Jur 26, Equitable Conversion/ § 1, p. 
483/ footnotes omitted. 
There are limitations to the doctrine: 
"The application of the doctrine of equitable conver-
sion depends somewhat on the circumstances under which it is 
invoked/ since the doctrine is not a fixed rule of law/ but 
proceeds on equitable principles which take into account the 
result to be accomplished. The doctrine is most frequently 
applied in solving questions concerning the validity and 
execution of trusts/ the legal character of the interests of 
the beneficiaries/ the devolution of property as between 
real and personal representatives/ and for other similar 
purposes. Equitable conversion is not favored in law/ how-
ever/ and the doctrine does not exist as a matter of right. 
It is to be invoked only when required by necessity and 
justice. And even where required/ the conversion must be 
kept within the limits of absolute necessity. The applica-
tion of the doctrine is always withheld where its effect 
would be contrary to the intention of the testator/ settlor/ 
or contracting parties. Moreover/ the doctrine will never 
be employed for the purpose of circumventing public policy/ 
or to sustain a fraud or a wrongful act." Id./ § 3/ pp. 
485-486/ footnotes omitted. 
As stated in 46 Am Jur 2d Judgments § 266/ "The general rule 
is that the interest of a vendor in lands contracted to be sold 
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i s bound r w hc
 t 1 en of ^ uidgment r e c o v e r e d a g a i n s t n^ - %•* 3 
t -
T h i s 4 our t -i.-, s * n r e e d y a a d r e s s e d t n e i s s u e p r e s e n t e d / 
but. d I Ot -i r ~t r 6 < " P n *" f rji.^P *-* > ') ] b 1 t ^ v^z. - ~,c\ \ - i -, n •  •*" H i p * -3 1 ] -g 1 t- \ -
< • <• • * y 
a contract vendor. In Butler v. Wilkinson 4t; F.2d iz44 1 tan 
1987 ) , this "our ~ • • « -S;dn^-^- - *• T>-,y attach r^e 
i n t e r e s • -- - 1 : - • .: • n ... , . \. •.-; ; -
t.he extent of his equ.it..- ' ;e property. In so doing tne court 
commented A:J -n the doctrine as it: applies ' ' ••"*- vendor: "u h 
t "'e cridL.-i . ' e " i ..-.-a t Mu:t^. - :. f 
the vendor -JO having ;w .nterest in civ? land is not wheiiy 
accurate. « «, „ ihe vendor also nas di* interest that he car: sell 
or mortqaae that is measured bv the amount the vendee owes ui ider 
tne contract " 'i P./d at. >,!Sh (root = ore omitted). The court 
noted th it a vpnd" r ' <=• interest ^ 1'- sometimes been referred to as 
a 1 ien Da. o^ - c : ^ .  -nt . . • - ^;i :or parts wi th ti t : ^  ; is 
not in fact a . it J ..P rjtiic * letained interest :-1 
+
" ie land * "• 1* ~- -:^r^-*ci :" * .n tuc s ~-nd -r. * :•= retent*c '* * " ' ?e 
r t . .- 1 . J „ • - i _ i t -
transfer ;r ^ is interest will not refeat the liens whien attached 
during his ownership the .-->r:^ t adoed- "Mor for that matter is 
Igrnc .•:• -••--. r -: ; 
vendor's sale of tnar. ].r:erest r • cr : ro ; erson ' Id, it 1258. 
Sue"- in expression is wholly '^consistent with ' n- ;on--i.:-
S3 Ol l Of . .-^-^ .• ; ,;..::; *.. 
can never a11ach to a vendor *s intetes : 0ef1n11 ior a t udg-• 
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ment lien only attaches to an interest in real property- U.C.A. 
§ 78-22-1. Therefore/ when the Butler opinion refers to "a 
judgment lien against the vendorfs interest11/ it necessarily 
refers to an interest in real property. 
The general rule that a judgment lien does attach to the 
retained title of a contract vendor has been applied in numerous 
instances in other jurisdictions. See First Security Bank v. 
Rogers/ 429 P.2d 386 (Idaho 1967); May v. Emerson/ 96 P. 454 (Or. 
1908); Heath v. Dodson/ 110 P.2d 845 (Wash. 1941); Monroe v. 
Lincoln City Emp. Credit Union/ 279 N.W.2d 866 (Neb. 1979); 
Scoular Grain Co. v. Pioneer Valley Sav. Bank/ 447 N.W.2d 38 
(Neb. 1989); Mooring v. Brown/ 763 F.2d 386 (10th Cir. 1985) 
[applying Colorado law]; Yarnall v. First Nat. Bank of Still-
water/ 74 B.R. 3 (D.S.D. 1986) [applying South Dakota law]; 
Uffenheimer v. Rob Con Enterprises/ Inc./ 425 N.Y.S.2d 856 
(1980); and Lang v. Klinger/ 34 Cal.App.3d 987, 992, 110 
Cal.Rptr. 532, 534-535 (1973). 
First Security Bank v. Rogers, supra/ 429 P.2d 386/ cited 
with approval in Butler v. Wilkinson/ is instructive. In that 
case/ Rogers sold certain real property in Nez Perce County on 
contract to the Eatons in December 1959. In January 1962, Nez 
Perce Roller Mills obtained a judgment against the Rogers and 
filed an abstract of the judgment in the Nez Perce County 
recorder's office. Subsequently/ other persons obtained 
judgments against Rogers.. In April 1965/ the Eatons deposited a 
lump sum final payment under the contract of sale into an escrow 
account with First Security Bank. First Security deposited the 
12 
$ 4 , 0 f c l . 8 * v :> . . : ' fc:leJ i.. - r e p l e a d e r z ' . ; t e -
'Ls e -*'* r 
Mi U s moveo *„:u, " , ; JI ;:uaLiiaiy u d g m e n c , n uu*-.- MI SJ^I. . i t " t s 
j u d g m e n t , ,. * , * « • . r~ -• i .. c o c k e r e d . \ t i / P e r / e .'oui * / a i , ^ * n e 
I: .1 i 
S u p r e m e C o u r t a f f i r in e d / s t a t i n g : 
"Appellants contend that the doctrine of equitable 
conversion must apply/ so that after execution of the 
contract with the Eatons/ Rogers' interest in the property 
was transformed from an interest in realty to an interest :in 
personalty to which the judgment lien could not attach. 
The doctrine of equitable conversion is a fiction 
resting upon the fundamental rule of equity that equity 
regards that as done which ought to be done 
. ., . the doctrine is not oi ie o£ universal application. 
Dean Pound has stated [quoting from Pound, The Progress of 
the Law 1918-1919/ 33 Harv.L.Rev. 813, 831 (1920)]: 
"When we speak of conversion we are not describing a 
condition of the property for all purposes with respect 
to everybody but are giving a name to a situation 
resulting from the application of equitable doctrines 
to a state of facts between certain parties." 
The doctrine of equitable conversion generally does not 
apply to the facts of the instant case. The majority rule 
is that a judgment lien against a vendor after the making of 
the contract of sale, but prior to making and delivery of 
the deed, extends to all of the vendor's interest remaining 
in the land and binds the land to the extent of the unpaid 
purchase price . [ C i t a t i o n s ] . "  4 2 9 P.2d at 389. 
• See also, May v. Emerson/ 96 P.2d 454 (Or. 1908), which held 
"It is beyond controversy that the title remains in the 
vendor unti 1 the actual delivery of the deed. The vendor 
still has not only the legal title, but also an interest in 
the property as security for the payment of the purchse 
price; and this interest should be and is available to a 
creditor through the lien of his judgment . . If the 
purchase price is fully paid, although the deed is not 
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actually delivered/ the vendor having but the naked legal 
title/ the judgment creditor can acquire no more. 
[Citations.] But to the extent of the unpaid purchase price 
the creditor's lien will bind the property . . .." 96 P. at 
455. 
May v. Emerson was followed in Heider v. DietZ/ 380 P.2d 619 
(Or. 1963). Heider/ however/ contains a misleading headnote 
which states: "Under 'equitable conversion1/ vendor's security 
interest in land is treated as personalty not reached by docket-
ing of judgment against vendor . . .." In fact/ the headnote 
trumpets the contention of the appellant in that case but the 
Oregon Supreme Court rejected that contention and held that the 
doctrine of equitable conversion would not be applied "under 
facts making such application clearly improper." 
In Monroe v. Lincoln City Emp. Credit Union/ 279 N.W.2d 866 
(Neb. 1979)/ the Olsons contracted to sell their property in 
Lancaster County on June 29/ 1977. In July 1977/ the credit 
union filed suit against the Olsons and obtained a default 
judgment. The credit union docketed the judgment in Lancaster 
County on August 1, 1977. On August 8/ 1977/ the Olsons 
transfered the property to the plaintiffs by warranty deed. As 
in the instant case/ the plaintiffs in Monroe argued that the 
Olsons1 interest in the property had been equitably converted 
into personalty and therefore the judgment did not become a lien 
against the realty. The trial court agreed/ but the Nebraska 
Supreme Court did not and reversed/ holding as follows: "[T]he 
doctrine of equitable conversion does not apply for all purposes 
and in every situation where there is a contract for the purchase 
of land. [H]Equitable conversion is merely fa name given to 
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their action. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court and 
held that under Colorado law the holders of the judgment lien had 
a superior interest to that of the grantees under the subsequent 
deed/ even though the grantees acquired title from one who purch-
ased the property on contract from the judgment debtor prior to 
3 
entry of the judgment. 
See also/ Uffenheimer v. Rob Con Enterprises/ Inc./ 425 
N.Y.S.2d 856 (1980), wherein the court states: "It has long been 
the rule in this state, as in most others/ that the vendor's 
interest in realty under an executory contract of sale is subject 
to judgment liens to the extent that the purchase money remains 
unpaid." 
In this case it is stipulated that Diane Hodge owed the 
Barkers $87/747.40 under the Uniform Real Estate Contract to 
purchase the Lockhart Road property at the time the Clements 
docketed their judgment against the Barkers in Salt Lake County. 
The Barkers owed $33/282.50 on the property to two financial 
institutions. That left the Barkers with a remaining interest in 
the Lockhart Road property of $54,464.90, and it is that amount 
which the Clements are entitled to recover. 
3. In Mooring, a title search was conducted and title insur-
ance was obtained for the benefit of the plaintiffs, but the 
search failed to reveal the existence of the judgment lien. In 
the instant case, a title search for the benefit of the 
Cannefaxes did reveal the judgment lien but the title insurer 
bound insurance anyway. Mooring does not address the issue of 
equitable conversion, but the court certainly did not apply the 
doctrine. 
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B. 
THE CASES RELIED UPON BY THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WHICH DISCUSS THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE CONVERSION 
DO NOT SUPPORT THE PROPOSITION THAT THE DOCTRINE 
MUST BE APPLIED IN ALL CASES OR IN THIS CASE 
IN PARTICULAR 
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realty and the purchaser had taken possession and made all pay-
ments including taxes and water district obligations. Upon the 
husband!s death the wife attempted to claim a statutory dower 
exclusion to limit the inheritance taxes due. Since the wife had 
entered into the contract to sell the property she had waived her 
dower rights and there were no intervening factors to support a 
refusal to apply equitable conversion to her remaining interest. 
Accordingly, it was held that the widow could not claim a statu-
tory dower exclusion. 
Jelco, Incorporated v. Third Judicial District Court, 29 
Utah 472, 511 P.2d 739 (1973), involved a proceeding in eminent 
domain and the question was how the proceeds should be disbursed 
as between the vendor and vendee under an executory contract for 
the sale of the land. There were no intervening rights of third 
parties to consider. This court determined that the vendor was 
entitled to the value of his contract rights and the vendee was 
entitled to any increased value in the land. 
In each of these cases this court applied the equitable 
conversion doctrine because, upon consideration of the facts 
involved, it was equitable to do so. In Reynolds v. Van Wagoner, 
592 P.2d 593 (Utah 1979), this court declined to apply the 
equitable conversion doctrine. In that case an executory sale 
contract provided that in the event the vendee failed to pay 
taxes on the property the vendor could, at his option, pay said 
taxes and reclaim the expense from the vendee. The vendee failed 
to pay the taxes from 1972 to 1975, whereupon the vendor paid the 
taxes and received an auditor's tax deed. The vendor claimed 
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ownership of the property rather than a mere right to reimburse-
ment. Among other things he asserted that equitable conversion 
compelled this result. This court rejected the claim, stating: 
"Nor does the doctrine of equitable conversion afford Reynolds 
any relief. Although this court has on occasion applied that 
doctrine to achieve equitable results, it cannot be invoked to 
alter contractual commitments made by the parties, and is not 
applicable to the situation at hand." 592 P.2d at 594. 
C. 
LACH V. DESERET BANK WAS ERRONEOUSLY DECIDED 
AND SHOULD BE OVERRULED 
The Utah Court of Appeals also relief upon its own case, 
Lach v. Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802 (Utah App. 1987). Lach 
concluded, in part, that under the doctrine of equitable 
conversion the vendor under a binding earnest money agreement 
does not own an interest in real property to which a judgment 
lien can attach. However, this court is not bound by the Lach 
decision, and Lach should be overruled. The applicable holding 
in Lach is dicta; it is not well reasoned or supported by the 
cases cited in the opinion; and most importantly, it conflicts 
with this court's opinion in Butler v. Wilkinson, supra, 740 P.2d 
1244. 
1. 
The Lach Discussion on Equitable Conversion is Dicta 
The Lach opinion's discussion of the doctrine of equitable 
conversion is dicta. In that case, an earnest money receipt and 
offer to purchase property in Garfield County was signed on 
November 28, 1980, by the Dewsnups as sellers and David Lach as 
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buyer. On the same date the Dewsnups gave a quit-claim deed to 
the property in favor of Foothill Properties/ a name under which 
Lach conducted business. On December 12, 1980, Deseret Bank 
docketed a judgment against the Dewsnups in Garfield County. In 
part III of the opinion the Court of Appeals correctly held that 
"A judgment creditor cannot place a lien against the property of 
a judgment debtor's grantee." 746 P.2d at 804. Since the 
judgment debtors quitclaimed the property to Lach before the 
judgment was docketed in Garfield County, the property no longer 
legally belonged to the judgment debtors. The discussion in part 
IV of the opinion, concerning equitable conversion, was thus 
unnecessary to a resolution of the appeal. 
2. 
Lach Conflicts With Butler v. Wilkinson 
As discussed earlier in this brief, in Butler v. Wilkinson, 
supra, 740 P.2d 1244 at 1257-1258, this court, albeit in dicta, 
expressly recognized the propriety of a judgment lien against the 
interest retained by a contract vendor ("Nor, for that matter, is 
a judgment lien against the vendor's interest extinguished by the 
vendor's sale of that interest to a third person"). The Lach 
discussion of equitable conversion cannot be reconciled with this 
court's statement to the contrary in Butler. 
3. 
The Cases Cited in the Lach Discussion of Equitable 
Conversion Do Not Compel the Conclusion Reached 
By the Court of Appeals in That Case Or 
in This Case 
The cases cited in the Lach discussion of equitable 
conversion are the same ones relied upon by the Court of Appeals 
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in its opinion in this case: Allred v. Allred/ supra, 15 Utah 2d 
396, 393 P.2d 791; In re Estate of Willson, supra, 28 Utah 2d 
197, 499 P.2d 1298? and Jelco, Incorporated v. Third Judicial 
Dist. Court, supra, 29 Utah 2d 472, 511 P.2d 739. 
As discussed in part B of this Argument, those cases apply 
the doctrine of equitable conversion, but on facts not at all 
similar to those of the instant case. 
D. 
THERE ARE NO EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS IN THIS CASE 
THAT WOULD PRECLUDE THE CLEMENTS1 JUDGMENT LIEN 
FROM ATTACHING TO THEIR DEBTORS1 REMAINING 
INTEREST IN THE LOCKHART ROAD PROPERTY 
Utah's judgment lien statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1, 
evidences a strong public policy in favor of satisfaction of 
judgments. Indeed, a judgment lien has always been regarded as 
the highest form of security to a creditor. Belnap v. Blain, 575 
P.2d 696, 700 (Utah 1978). A judgment creditors lien on the 
property interest of his debtor should not be disregarded based 
on a legal fiction unless there are strong equitable considera-
tions in favor of the debtor or some third party. 
In the instant case there are no such equitable considera-
tions. When the Barkers gave a warranty deed to Diane Hodge 
after the Clements1 judgment against the Barkers had been 
docketed, Hodge had constructive notice of the existence of the 
judgment lien. So did Hodge's grantees, the Cannefaxes. In 
fact, prior to recording the deeds from the Barkers to Hodge and 
from Hodge to the Cannefaxes, the settlement agent, Security 
Title Agency did a title search which disclosed the Clements1 
judgment. At that point Hodge and the Cannefaxes, through their 
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agent/ had actual notice of the judgment. Although the 
stipulated facts do not explicitly so indicate/ it is clear that 
when that final title search was done/ the deeds and the money 
from the closing that went to the Barkers were in escrow. The 
title search which disclosed the judgment would not have been 
conducted if it were then too late for the Cannefaxes to insist 
that a newly-discovered encumbrance be cleared. At that point in 
time the Cannefaxes were in a position to protect themselves by 
insisting that the judgment lien be cleared/ as they would have 
every right to do in view of the fact that the Barkers were 
warranting a clear title to Hodge/ and Hodge was warranting a 
clear title to the Cannefaxes. Instead/ for whatever reason/ the 
settlement agent chose to ignore the judgment/ bind title insur-
ance on the property/ and record the deeds. 
The Clements recognize that their judgment lien was subject 
to existing equities of third parties in the property as well as 
prior encumbrances. For that reason/ the Clements have always 
acknowledged that they are entitled to foreclose on their 
judgment only to the extent that Diane Hodge still owed the 
Barkers on the Uniform Real Estate Contract less the amount of 
prior encumbrances/ at time of delivery of the warranty deed from 
the Barkers to her. Thus/ the Cannefaxes did not risk the loss 
of their equity in the property. In other contexts this court 
has held that a judgment lien attaches to a debtor's property 
only to the extent that the value of the property exceeds exempt 
amounts. See, Gray v. Stevens, 5 Utah 2d 361, 302 P.2d 273 
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(1956) (judgment lien attached to value of homestead property 
only in excess of amount of homestead exemption). 
Those equities existing in this case favor the judgment 
creditors. As stated by the trial court in ruling on the 
Clements1 summary judgment motion: "Now/ the question is/ if the 
Court is to be persuaded to rule under equitable doctrines/ what 
is or what isn't equitable? Who was in the better position to 
anticipate the ultimate implications of that cloud on title/ and 
to deal with it at the time of purchase of the property by the 
4 
plaintiffs in this case?" The answer is clear. Diane Hodge and 
the Cannefaxes1 agent/ a title insurer/ became aware of the 
existence of the judgment against the Barkers at a time when the 
deeds had not been recorded and money available to apply toward 
5 
that judgment was not yet disbursed to the Barkers. 
On the other hand/ a rule recognizing the doctrine of 
equitable conversion in this case/ and holding that a contract 
seller's retained interest in the property is personalty/ will 
benefit only the title insurer who chose to bind insurance/ 
4. The transcript of the hearing on the summary judgment 
motion is a part of the addendum to this brief. 
5. The majority opinion of the Court of Appeals states that 
the Clements "sat on their rights failing to pursue their 
remedies. It is not inequitable that as a result they cannot 
collect their judgment against a subsequent innocent purchaser." 
Cannefax v. Clement/ 786 P.2d 1377, 1383 (Utah App. 1990). While 
it is not a part of the record/ the fact is the Clements did not 
know of the existence of the Lockhart Road property until 
November 1986/ more than a year after the real estate closing. 
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record the deeds, and disburse money to the Barkers after it 
became aware of the Clements1 judgment. 
E. 
THIS COURT SHOULD HOLD THAT BOTH THE VENDEE AND VENDOR 
OF PROPERTY BEING SOLD ON CONTRACT HAVE AN OWNERSHIP 
INTEREST WHICH MAY BE SUBJECT TO THE LIEN 
OF A JUDGMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals also was mistaken in applying a 
"parity of reasoning" approach to the issue of whether a contract 
vendor's remaining interest in the property being sold is real or 
personal property. Relying on a single sentence of this court's 
opinion in Butler v. Wilkinson, supra, 740 P.2d at 1255, in which 
this court discussed the general concept of the doctrine of 
equitable conversion, the Utah Court of Appeals concluded that if 
a contract vendee's interest in the property being purchased is 
real property, then "by a parity of reasoning" the seller!s 
retained interest must be personal property. 
The Clements have absolutely no argument with the holding of 
Butler that a contract vendee's interest in real property being 
purchased on contract is subject to the lien of a judgment 
against the vendee. The Clements submit, however, that there is 
no good reason why the vendor's interest may not also be subject 
to the lien of a judgment against the vendor. The courts of 
several jurisdictions have recognized that both the vendor and 
vendee have an ownership interest in real property being purch-
ased on contract, either one of which might become subject to a 
judgment lien. Compare, e.g., Cascade Sec. Bank v. Butler, 567 
P.2d 631 (Wash. 1977), holding that the vendee's interest may 
become subject to a judgment lien, with Heath v. Dodson, supra, 
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110 P.2d 845/ holding the same with respect to the vendor's 
retained iaterest; Fulton v. Duro/ 700 P.2d 14 (Idaho 1985) 
[vendee's interest]/ with First Security Bank v. Rogers/ supra/ 
429 P.2d 386 [vendor's interest]; and Fridley v. Munson/ 194 N.W. 
840 (S.D. 1923) [vendee's interest] with Yarnall v. First Nat. 
Bank of Stillwater/ supra/ 74 B.R. 3 [vendor's interest]. As 
stated in Fridley v. Munson/ supra/ 194 N.W. at 841: "[W]e can 
see no valid reason why [the South Dakota judgment lien statute] 
should not be held to include equitable as well as legal estates 
it 
In Cascade Sec. Bank v. Butler/ supra/ 567 P.2d 631/ the 
Washington Supreme Court chose to avoid the "nebulous character" 
of the equitable conversion doctrine altogether and simply hold 
that a real estate contract vendee's interest is real estate 
within the meaning of the Washington judgment lien statute/ 
stating: "To base our decision upon this fiction would embark us 
upon a case-by-case determination of the boundaries of the 
doctrine in this State. Rather we are content to limit ourselves 
to the pertinent issue . . . and declare that a vendee's interest 
is real estate within the meaning of the judgment lien statutes." 
567 P.2d at 634. In so doing/ that court's earlier holding in 
Heath v. Dodson/ supra/ 110 P.2d 845/ was left intact. 
The Clements urge this court to reach a like result. The 
extent to which a contract vendor's interest may be subject to a 
judgment lien should be the amount still to be paid to the vendor 
at the time the lien attaches; the extent to which a contract 
vendee's interest may be subject to the lien of a judgment 
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against him should be measured by his equity in the property. 
Such a result would give Utah's judgment lien statute the full 
effect of its broad language. 
Finally/ such a result would also comport with and give 
emphasis to the language in Butler v. Wilkinson recognizing that 
a vendor's retained interest in property sold on contract is 
really no mere lien/ but is in fact legal title to the property/ 
subject to a conditional promise to convey at a future tieme. 
740 P.2d at 1256 n. 6. Unlike the trustee under a resulting or 
constructive trust/ and unlike the contract seller who has 
received the full purchase price but who has not yet given a 
deed/ the contract seller under an executory land sale contract 
does not have a mere naked title. He retains the right to sell 
that legal title to another/ subject to his vendee's interest. 
He retains a right to regain possession of the property upon 
default. He retains the right to sue at law to prevent the 
vendee from committing waste to the property while the contract 
is executory. 
6. Utah law recognizes the possibility of a third-person 
having an interest in real property which Is subject to 
execution. See Rule 69(e)(3)/ Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
"[W]hen the [execution] sale is of real property . . . or when a 
portion of such real property is claimed by a third person- and 
he requires it to be sold separately/ such portion must be thus 
sold." 
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F. 
THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER THE ADDITIONAL PUBLIC 
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS RAISED IN JUDGE BULLOCKfS 
DISSENTING OPINION IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Finally, the Clements recomment to this court Judge 
Bullock's dissent from the majority opinion in the Court of 
Appeals. Cannefax v. Clement/ supra, 786 P.2d 1377 at 1383-1391. 
Judge Bullock1s dissenting opinion is clearly the product of much 
thought and research. The Clements respectfully submit that it 
would be duplicative to repeat or paraphrase in full the points 
raised in Judge Bullockfs dissenting opinion/ but they fully 
adopt the reasoning of that dissent. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the stipulated facts/ the arguments set forth in 
this brief, and the arguments raised in the dissenting opinion of 
Judge Bullock in the Court of Appeals, petitioners Donald and 
Ruth Clement respectfully submit that this court should overrule 
the decision and judgment of the Utah Court of Appeals and 
reinstate the Summary Judgment in their f^vor entered by the 
trial court. 
Petitioners also respectfully submit that they should be 
awarded their costs on appeal. 
Dated this /7 day of July, 1990. 
By /^t/^ 
Steven H. Lybb^tt yb e 
Attorney for Petitioners 
Donald W. Clement and Ruth L, 
Clement 
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ADDENDUM 
1. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-22-1 
2. STIPULATED FACTS 
3. REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS [ON DEFENDANTS 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT] 
4. ORDER AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
5. OPINION, INCLUDING THE CONCURRING AND DISSENTING 
OPINIONS, DELIVERED BY THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-22-1 
From the time the judgment of the district court or circuit 
court is docketed and filed in the office of the clerk of the 
district court of the county it becomes a lien upon all the real 
property of the judgment debtor/ not exempt from execution/ in 
the county in which the judgment is entered/ owned by him at the 
time or by him thereafter acquired during the existence of said 
lien. A transcript of judgment rendered in a district court or 
circuit court of this state/ in any county thereof/ may be filed 
and docketed in the office of the clerk of the district court of 
any other county/ and when so filed and docketed it shall h^ve/ 
for purposes of lien and enforcement/ the same force and effect 
as a judgment entered in the district court in such county. The 
lien shall continue for eight years unless the judgment is 
previously satisfied or unless the enforcement of the judgment is 
stayed on appeal by the execution of a sufficient undertaking as 
provided by law/ in which case the lien of the judgment ceases. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RAYMOND P.L. CANNEFAX and | 
DEBRA CANNEFAX, ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ; 
DONALD W. CLEMENT and RUTH L. ] 
CLEMENT, ; 
Defendants. ] 
1 STIPULATED FACTS 
I Civil No. C87-6232 
1 Judge Pat B. Brian 
Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney, Rodney M. 
Pipella, and defendants, by and through their attorneys, Steven 
H. Lybbert and Bruce E. Coke of Nygaard, Coke & Vincent, stipulate 
to the following facts. In doing so, counsel agree that other 
facts not stipulated to may be relevant to the issues raised in 
the pleadings. 
STIPULATED FACTS 
1. On August 28, 1981, George W. Barker, Jr. and Lila 
M. Barker ("the Barkers") were fee simple owners of the real 
property described in paragraph 5 of plaintiffs' Verified 
Complaint ("the Lockhart Road property"). 
2. On August 28, 1981, the Barkers entered into a 
Uniform Real Estate Contract with Diane Hodge for sale of the 
Lockhart Road property for the sum of $160,000.00, payable 
$40,000.00 down and the balance over a period of time with 
interest. 
3. At the time of the contract sale from the Barkers 
to Diane Hodge, there existed prior mortgage loan obligations 
against the property in favor of Prudential Federal Savings & 
Loan Association ("Prudential") and Continental Bank and Trust 
Company ("Continental"). 
4. On August 31, 1981, Ms. Hodge caused a Notice of 
Contract to be recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder as 
Entry No. 3600195 at Book 5287, Page 315. 
5. On August 15, 1985, defendants Donald W. Clement 
and Ruth L. Clement obtained a Judgment in the Seventh Judicial 
District Court of Uintah County against the Barkers in the 
amount of $70,526.00. 
6. On August 19, 1985, defendants1 Judgment was 
docketed with the Clerk of the Third Judicial District Court of 
Salt Lake County in Docket Book 200 at Page 153. 
7. Defendants' Judgment against the Barkers was not 
appealed. 
8. On September 25, 1985, rminediately prior to the 
transaction described in the paragraphs which follow, the Barkers 
held legal title to the Lockhart Road property, subject to Diane 
-2-
Hodge's interest under the Uniform Real Estate Contract.1 
9. On September 25, 1985, Diane Hodge owed $87,747.40 
under the Uniform Real Estate Contract to the Barkers. The prior 
obligations to Prudential and Continental totaled $33,282.50. 
10. On September 25, 1985, the Barkers gave a Warranty 
Deed to the Property to Diane Hodge. The Warranty Deed was 
recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder on September 26, 1985 
as Entry No. 4142674 at Book No. 5694, beginning at Page 1268. 
11. On September 25, 1985, at the time of delivery of 
the Warranty Deed referred to in paragraph 10, Diane Hodge paid 
the Barkers $45,000.00, and the Barkers gave Ms. Hodge a credit 
of $9,464.94. The mortgage loan balance in favor of Prudential 
in the sum of $5,960.20 was paid off, as was the mortgage loan 
balance in favor of Continental in the sum of $27,322.30. 
12. Also on September 25, 1985, Diane Hodge gave a 
Warranty Deed to the Property to plaintiffs Raymond P.L. Cannefax 
and Debra Cannefax. The Warranty Deed was recorded with the Salt 
Lake County Recorder on September 26, 1985, as Entry No. 4142675 
at Book No. 5694, beginning at Page 1270. 
13. The two transactions discussed above—the transfer 
of title from the Barkers to Diane Hodge, and the transfer of 
title from Diane Hodge to plaintiffs—took place at a single real 
estate closing. A true and correct copy of the U.S. Department 
1. After entering into the contract with Ms. Hodge, the Barkers 
gave quit claim deeds to the property to other people named 
Barker—presumably their children. On or before September 25, 
1985, but prior to the other transactions of September 25, the 
Barkers received back quit claim deeds to the property from their 
quit claim grantees. 
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of Housing and Urban Development Settlement Statement between 
Diane Hodge and plaintiffs is attached hereto. 
14. A title search conducted by the settlement agent, 
Surety Title Agency, between closing on September 25, 1985 and 
recording on September 26, 1985 disclosed defendants' Judgment 
against the Barkers. 
Dated this jQfi day of December, 1987. 
Rojkl^ M. Pipella 
Awrorney for Plainti ror ffs 
Dated this i*E day of December, 1987. 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
By A^^i^^ 
Steven H. Lybtfert 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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DE3RA CANNEFAX, 
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-vs-
DONALD W. CLEMENT and RUTH 
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• * * 
Civil No. C87-S232 
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DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
February 29, 19188 
• * * 
APPEARANCES: 
For the Plaintiffs: 
For the Defendants: 
RODNEY M. PIPELLA 
643 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
STEVEftf H. LYB3ERT 
350 Sbutn 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34111 
BRAD J. YOUNG 
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 
CQPJ 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Cannefax vs. Clement, C87-6232. Counsel 
will state an appearance for the record, please. 
MR, LYBBERT: Steven Lybbert for the defendants. 
MR. PIPELLA: Rodney Pipella for the plaintiffs. 
THE COURT: You may proceed. 
MR. LYBBERT: We would move for summary judgment 
both as to the complaint and on the counterclaim for 
declaratory relief that has been filed. The parties have, I 
believe, stipulated — they certainly stipulated to facts, and 
I think the facts they have stipulated to are sufficient to 
resolve all the issues involved on both the complaint and 
counterclaim. 
Briefly, to paraphrase those facts, Mr. and 
Mrs. Barker owned a piece of property. They entered into a 
uniform real estate contract with Dianne Hodge to sell that 
property. Thereafter, the defendants, Mr. and Mrs. Clement, 
obtained a judgment against the Barkers, and docketed that 
judgment in Salt Lake County. About a month after the 
judgment had been docketed Dianne Hodge paid off the contract 
and obtained a deed to the property, and on that same day she 
sold the property again by warranty deed to the plaintiffs, 
the Cannefaxes. At the time that Dianne Hodge obtained her 
warranty deed from the Barkers, and at the time that she gave 
a warranty deed to the plaintiffs, the Cannefaxes, she owed 
2 
1 about $88,000 on the contract. Thefe was $33,000, 
2 approximately, owing to a couple of lenders who had first and 
3 second position. At the closing thqse two lenders were paid 
4 off. The Barkers gave Dianne Hodge a $9,000 credit, and she 
5 paid the remaining $45,000 to the Barkers. The fact that the 
6 judgment lien — excuse me, the fact that the judgment had 
7 been docketed was discovered between closing and recording of 
8 the various deeds the next day. So there is — 
9 THE COURT: What was the amount of the judgment 
10 obtained by the plaintiffs? 
11 MR. LYBBERT: Approximately $70,000. 
12 I believe the issue is whether that judgment, when 
13 it was docketed in Salt Lake County, became a lien on the 
14 interest that the Barkers retained in the property — they 
15 certainly had legal title to the property — it is my position 
16 and I believe that the case law and treatises support me, that 
17 the general rule is that when a judgment is obtained against a 
18 person who owns property, who has sold that property on 
19 contract, then the lien attaches to the property, to the 
20 extent that the contract remains unpaid, which in this case, 
2 1 as of the date that they had actual knowledge of the judgment 
22 and the fact it had been docketed in Salt Lake County, it 
23 was — after you take away the $33,000 that was owed to the 
24 two prior lenders, that leaves $54,0p0. 
25 I believe the determinative case is Butler vs. 
Wilkinson, which is discussed in both my memorandum and my 
reply to Plaintiff's opposition to the motion. It clearly 
recognizes the possibility of a judgment lien against the 
contract vendor's interest, and clearly states that a judgment 
lien against the vendor's interest is not extinguished by the 
vendor's sale of that interest to a third person. 
My memorandum will certainly go into more detail 
than I want to now, unless you want more detail. I feel 
confident that the memoranda that I submitted states my 
position pretty clearly. The plaintiffs suggest that the 
Clements' remedy should have been to perhaps garnish Dianne 
Hodge, but that ignores the fact they didn't know that the 
Barkers owned this property, this particular piece of 
property, until after they docketed their judgment in Salt 
Lake County, and in fact after — long after the property had 
then been sold — or a deed had been given from the Barkers to 
the Hodges and — the Barkers to Dianne Hodge and from Dianne 
Hodge to the Cannefaxes. 
THE COURT: Counsel, one more time, in addition to 
the factual transaction, outline for the Court, put the dates 
in. Start from the time that the Barkers sell, and then 
indicate the dates when the Clements' obtained their judgment, 
when it was recorded, and then when the property was sold 
again. 
MR. LYBBERT: The Barkers sold the property on 
4 
contract on August 28, 1981. 
THE COURT: And that sale was to Hodges? 
MR. LYBBERT: Right, to Hodge. 
THE COURT: And that was when? 
MR. LYBBERT: August 28, 1981. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. LYBBERT: On August 15, 1985, the Clements 
obtained their judgment for $70,526. 
THE COURT: Was it recorded again? 
MR. LYBBERT: It was recorded or docketed in Salt 
Lake County four days later, on August 19, 1985, 
THE COURT: The Clements obtained and recorded a 
judgment for how much? 
MR. LYBBERT: $70,526. 
THE COURT: Against? 
MR. LYBBERT: Mr. and Mrs. George Barker. 
THE COURT: Both? 
MR. LYBBERT: Yes. 
THE COURT: And that occurrled on what date? 
MR. LYBBERT: They obtained the judgment on August 
15, 1985, and that was in Uintah County. 
THE COURT: It is the recording that's critical. 
MR. LYBBERT: August 19, 1985. 
THE COURT: August 1 9 , 1985f? 
MR. LYBBERT: Correct. 
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THE COURT: Go ahead. Take it on through. 
MR. LYBBERT: About 36 days later, on September 25, 
1985, the Barkers gave a warranty deed to Dianne Hodge, and on 
that same day and immediately thereafter Dianne Hodge gave a 
warranty deed to Mr. and Mrs. Cannefax. 
THE COURT: The Barkers gave their warranty deed on 
what, September — 
MR. LYBBERT: 25. 
THE COURT: 1985? 
MR. LYBBERT: Correct. 
THE COURT: To the Clements? 
MR. LYBBERT: No, to Dianne Hodge. The Clements are 
the judgment creditors. 
THE COURT: What did she do with it? 
MR. LYBBERT: On that same day she gave a warranty 
deed to the plaintiffs in this action, Mr. and Mrs. Cannefax. 
THE COURT: On what date? 
MR. LYBBERT: Also September 25, 1985. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. LYBBERT: Those are the dates and transactions 
that the parties have stipulated to. It is not in the 
stipulated facts, but then it was probably late 1987, fall of 
1987, that the Clements discovered the existence of this 
property, and sought to foreclose on the judgment lien, and in 
response the Cannefaxes brought this action to find that they 
6 
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have title — 
THE COURT: Superior — 
MR. LY3BERT: Superior to the judgment lien. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. LYBBERT: Back then, on September 25, 1985, 
there was a balance due on that uniform real estate contract 
of approximately — I think it was $88,000. And at that time 
there were obligations owed to two different lending 
institutions, totaling $33,000. So it is my position that the 
Barkers, as of the date that — the judgment debtors, Barkers, 
as of the date they gave the deed to Hodge, still had an 
interest attached by the judgment lieti of $54,000. 
THE COURT: Is that the amount in dispute today? 
MR. LYBBERT: Yes. 
THE COURT: So the Clements are now trying to go 
against the property in the amount of $54,000? 
MR. LYBBERT: That's correct. I am rounding 
everything to the nearest thousand. 
THE COURT: Against the Cannefaxes? 
MR. LYBBERT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Anything furthe*? 
MR. LYBBERT: No. 
THE COURT: Counsel? 
MR. PIPELLA: Your Honor, the argument of the 
Cannefaxes is that at the time the uniform real estate 
7 
contract was entered into, in August of 1981, between the 
Barkers and Dianne Hodge, that equitable conversion took 
place, the theory of equitable conversion should be applied to 
determine the interest of the parties on that date, and for 
the remainder of the life of the contract. 
THE COURT: What would have a title check 
accomplished on this? 
MR. PIPELLA: The title check at that time would 
have disclosed that the Barkers held title to the property. 
Dianne Hodge at the time that she bought the property in 
August of 1981 had recorded a notice of interest, disclosing 
the interest of her contract. 
THE COURT: But supposing that on the morning of the 
transaction, September 25, 1985, there had been an update on 
the title policy, would not the recorded lien have been 
exposed? 
MR. PIPELLA: Your Honor, I think as part of the 
stipulated facts the title company that had done the date 
down, from the date of the prior commitment to the date of 
closing, did discover the Clement judgment as being docketed 
against the Barkers. 
THE COURT: Doesn't that put a buyer on notice? 
MR. PIPELLA: Your Honor, our position is that 
equitable conversion makes Dianne Hodge the owner of the real 
property, and that what the Barkers had at the time they 
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executed the contract was a personal property interest, a 
security interest. 
THE COURT: Supposing they had backed out on the 
deal • 
MR. PIPELLA: Who had backed out on the deal? 
THE COURT: The Barkers. Would they not still have 
retained title of the property subject to the recorded lien? 
MR. PIPELLA: They couldn't have backed out on the 
deal after August of 1981. 
THE COURT: Why not? 
MR. PIPELLA: Because they had entered into a 
uniform real estate contract and they owed Dianne Hodge the 
deed. If she performed, she could have sued for specific 
performance. 
THE COURT: If for some reason they had developed 
sellers1 remorse or some other proble|m arose and they said, 
Sue us, we don't want to go through with this deal, we have an 
emotional attachment to the property, we want to give it to 
our grandchildren, we don't want to go through with it, you 
sue us, what would have been the basis for the lawsuit, absent 
an action for specific performance? What would have been — . 
j 
MR, PIPELLA: Dianne Hodge pought the property, and 
was entitled to obtain the benefit of her bargain. The 
uniform real estate contract provides three separate remedies 
in paragraph 16, section 16, for nonperformance. Paragraph 
9 
16(a) provides a forfeiture provision, (b) allows the seller 
to sue the buyer for back installments, and paragraph 16(c) 
allows the contract seller to convey title and foreclose on 
the title as a mortgage — foreclose on the contract as a 
mortgage. At the time, in September or August of 1985, at the 
time that the Clements obtained their judgment, Dianne Hodge 
had paid 50 percent of the purchase price, 
THE COURT: When did she enter into the contract 
with the Barkers? 
MR. PIPELLA: In 1981. 
THE COURT: When? 
MR. PIPELLA: August. 
THE COURT: When? 
MR. PIPELLA: August 29. 
THE COURT: That was the day after — that was 
several days after the judgment was recorded against the 
property? 
MR. PIPELLA: No. Dianne Hodge bought the property 
in August of 1981. The Clements docketed their judgment in 
August of 1985, four years later. And then Dianne Hodge, in 
September of 1985, roughly 30 days following the docketing of 
the Clements1 judgment in Salt Lake County, resold the 
property to my clients. In that resale transaction, the 
Cannefaxes refinanced the property, and paid cash. Therefore, 
Dianne Hodge had enough money to pay off the Cannefaxes. She 
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paid them off in 1985, on a contract, that she had entered 
into with in 1981. Dianne Hodge had been in the possession of 
the property, had paid taxes. the Barkers couldn't have 
backed out at that particular point in time. Dianne Hodge had 
used it as her residence for four or five years. 
Our argument, your Honor, is at the time the uniform 
real estate contract is entered into, in August of 1981, that 
Dianne Hodge became the owner of the real property, and the 
doctrine of equitable conversion so States. The doctrine of 
equitable conversion is well described in the Butler vs. 
Wilkinson case, which is cited in both of our memorandums. 
The uniform real estate contract is Characterized in Butler 
vs. Wilkinson as a financing instrument, with the interest of 
the vendor, in this case the Barkers; being that as a 
mortgagee, just like any other mortgage holder. You have a 
personal property interest. The vendee is really the owner, 
and in Butler vs. Wilkinson they discuss that ownership 
interest. They have the risk of loss. They are the ones that 
are required to obtain insurance* 1^ the property were 
damaged or destroyed, they would be the ones that would suffer 
that loss post-contract. They are also the ones that have the 
right to occupy the property. 
THE COURT: Had she in fact been in occupancy 
exclusively for that four-year period Df time? 
MR. PIPELLA: When the contract closed in 1981, she 
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1 moved in and used it for her residence. At the time that she 
2 sold the property to my clients, she and her husband I believe 
3 had been transferred out of state, and were living in 
4 Minnesota, which I believe is where they were contacted — 
5 isn't it Minnesota? 
6 MR. LYBBERT: That's correct. 
7 MR. PIPELLA: Living in Minnesota in 1985. She had 
8 been occupying the property. Now, in the instant case, in 
9 this case, we are — if you follow Mr. Lybbertfs arguments, we 
10 are asked to treat a contract different than other security 
11 interests in a particular piece of property. A uniform real 
12 estate contract, in our position, your Honor, is nothing more 
13 than another method to finance the sale of property. And it 
14 should be treated as such. Utah code, at 78-22-1, dealing 
15 with judgment liens and when and on what property they become 
16 judgments, what property they become liens once docketed, 
17 describes that the judgment becomes a lien on the real 
18 property owned by the judgment debtor. Your Honor, my 
19 client — Dianne Hodge was the owner. I donft think that we 
20 can look at that word "owner" and say that there were two 
21 owners of the real property at the time that the Clements 
22 docketed their judgment. 
23 THE COURT: Do you have a legal and an equitable 
24 owner? 
25 MR. PIPELLA: Yes. You have an equitable owner of 
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the real property, which was Dianne Hodge. And the Barkers at 
that time had a security interest in the contract. At the 
time the judgment was'docketed, Dianne Hodge had paid almost 
50 percent of the property value. 
THE COURT: Whose name was the property still in? 
MR. PIPELLA: The property in 1985, at the time the 
judgment was docketed, title was still vested in the Barkers. 
THE COURT: The Court's next question is, would 
it — do not the recording statutes operate to put a buyer on 
notice that even up until the moment the transaction is 
finalized there ought to be an update on the title check of 
the property? Wouldn't an addendum to the title of that 
property have reflected and sent up red flags to your clients 
that the title to the property they were buying was 
encumbered, there was a cloud on it, there was a question 
about ownership? 
MR. PIPELLA: Well, the ownership, your Honor —• the 
answer to your question is yes, because there in fact was a 
search done, and they did search the title name, the Barkers 
and Dianne Hodge, and they searched the title judgment docket 
records for the name of my client as well. 
THE COURT: Did the recorded judgment — 
MR. PIPELLA: The docketed judgment I believe did 
show up in that search. 
THE COURT: What would a reasonable, prudent buyer 
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do in that case? Wouldn't they have required the seller of 
that property to impound funds or to take other steps to 
guaranty the full value of the purchase? 
MR. PIPELLA: Your Honor, ray clients weren't aware 
of the docketing of the judgment. Now, the title insurance 
company that closed the transaction was their agent, was also 
the agent for Dianne Hodge. Our position is that if a uniform 
real estate contract is a financing instrument, and Dianne 
Hodge was the equitable owner of the real property, and the 
Barkers held the personal property interest — 
THE COURT: And were the legal owners. 
MR. PIPELLA: Had fee title — not fee title, but 
record title — that the docketing of the judgment says it is 
a lien against real property owned by the judgment debtor. At 
this particular point in time, all that the Barkers had was a 
security interest, and it was personal property. What I am 
requesting and our point is that if Barkers had given a deed 
and taken back a note and deed of trust, we wouldn't be having 
this particular argument. Or if they had given a deed and 
taken back an all-inclusive note and deed of trust and wrapped 
the two prior encumbrances, we wouldn*t be having this 
argument. It is inequitable, where you have a contract sale, 
to treat it any differently than you would where the seller, 
the vendor, had given a deed and taken back a note and deed of 
trust. In both cases, your Honor, where he had taken back a 
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note and deed of trust or had sold the property on contract, 
he has the identical interest- He hats a personal property 
interest in the property itself, and the judgment doesn't 
attach. 
One of the items that Mr. Lybbert and the defendants 
don't bring up is that what if Dianne Hodge had just 
accelerated her payments? What if she had paid it off? What 
would her exposure be? Is it incumbent on her, before she 
makes every installment, to run and have the title checked? I 
assert, your Honor, that — 
THE COURT: Judgment against the property. 
MR. PIPELLA: In this case it is a judgment against 
the seller. But it puts the contract buyer in a position 
where they can't freely make the payments and can't freely 
deal with the seller for fear that a judgment comes of record 
against the seller, and they have to go down and check the 
record every time they make a payment. If Dianne Hodge had 
come into a windfall and had made the payment in this 
particular case, we may still be having the very same 
argument. That, your Honor, is inequitable. It is unfair. 
You have to treat the contract buyer as the owner of the real 
property, treat the seller as a mortgagee. That's what he is. 
In this particular case the Barkers -- if Dianne Hodge had 
defaulted in August of 1985, the Barkers, according to the 
terms of the contract, would have to have conveyed the 
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1 property, according to the terms of section 16(c), to Dianne 
2 Hodge, and then foreclosed on the property as a mortgage. 
3 Your Honor, I assert that what the — that what the 
4 Barkers had at the time was only a personal property interest, 
5 and that the cases that have been cited on our behalf describe 
6 the interest. The three cases that we have relied upon 
7 principally are Butler vs. Wilkinson, in re: Willson's estate, 
8 and Allred vs. Allred. In those three cases, your Honor, it 
9 describes the interest of the contract seller. The interest 
10 of the contract seller is personal property, is that of a 
11 mortgagee. 
12 The statute 78-22-1 says real property owned by the 
13 judgment debtor. If we have — if we are to give effect to 
14 the cases that we have cited, and apply that to 78-22-1, in 
15 determining whether or not — you know, who is the owner, and 
16 against whom would a judgment attach as a lien to the 
17 property, I think the only conclusion is, your Honor, that the 
18 real property interest was held by Dianne Hodge, and the fact 
19 that a judgment was docketed against the Barkers prior to the 
20 time she paid them off and took the deed should be treated 
21 just as if the Barkers held a mortgage on the property. 
22 In that particular case, if they held a mortgage on 
23 the property, held a security interest, then a judgment 
24 docketed against them would not be a lien on the property. 
25 Your Honor, I am saying if there was a mortgage, it should be 
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1 treated just like — pardon me, the mere fact there was a 
2 contract shouldn't make any difference to our determination 
3 here. The contract, as far as the Barkers were concerned, 
4 should be treated as a mortgage. 
5 THE COURT: Supposing the buyer had defaulted 
6 someplace along the line, they had been in possession of the 
7 property four or five years, and falll on hard times, and 
8 defaulted, then what is the legal position of the original 
9 seller? 
10 MR. PIPELLA: Sir, your Honor, depending on the 
11 amount of the payment that has been Received, I can't quote 
12 you chapter and verse from the Utah cases that establish when 
13 a forfeiture is proper, but part of the problem we are faced 
14 with here is that these land sale contracts have been treated 
15 as executory contracts'. If there is a default by the buyer, 
16 the seller is excused from performance. In Utah, dealing with 
17 land sale contracts, it is not always true that the seller1s 
18 performance is excused by a default by the buyer. In this 
19 particular case, Dianne Hodge paid 25 percent down when she 
20 bought the property in 1981. It was $160,000 purchase price. 
21 She paid $40,000 down. And depending on if — depending on 
22 \ the date that she would have defaulted after that, it is 
highly unlikely that one month following the date of her 
24 I default that the Court would have allowed a forfeiture. 
2 5 THE COURT: What about four years? 
23 
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MR. PIPELLA: Your Honor, she had paid more money 
after four years, because by the time we got to September of 
1985, she had reduced that $120,000 balance that was on the 
contract in August of 1981 down to $87,000. She had paid 
almost 50 percent of the purchase price in four years. And 
under no circumstances would a Utah court allow a forfeiture 
when the buyer had paid 50 percent of the purchase price over 
four years. The Court would require that the seller foreclose 
on that contract like a mortgage, utilizing 16(c). 
Our position is that — as well as one of the other 
points we make in our memorandums, was that the contract was 
no longer executory, in that performance, default in August of 
1985, at the time that the Clements obtained their judgment, 
would not have excused the Barkers1 performance. In order to 
have foreclosed on Dianne Hodge at that time, the contract 
required and the Utah case law would have required them to 
convey the property to Dianne Hodge and foreclose on that 
contract as a mortgage, pursuant to 16(c) of that contract. 
And so the contract was not even an executory contract in 
August of 1985. 
THE COURT: As a practical matter, if the Court 
ruled in your favor, what would be the remedies of all of the 
parties? 
MR. PIPELLA: Your Honor, the remedy that would 
exist in this case for the Clements would be the same remedy 
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1 that would exist for the Clements if the Barkers had taken 
2 back a note and a mortgage. I recognize the fact that the 
3 Clements weren't aware of this contract sale at the time they 
4 had docketed their judgment. I haven't taken their deposition 
5 on the matter, because I didn't figure that was ever really 
6 that important in order to argue this particular motion. 
7 But their remedy, the cases also that we have cited, 
8 in particular the Dahl vs. Prince case that's mentioned in our 
9 memorandum, is that a judgment creditor isn't a bona fide 
10 purchaser, and that a judgment creditor takes the debtor's 
11 interest as he has it in the property. He doesn't have any 
12 better position, doesn't have any worse position, because he 
13 obtains his judgment. 
14 The remedy that I see on behalf of the Clements is 
15 that they — again, it is cited in our memorandum, proposed in 
16 our memorandum — is that they just execute on the note, which 
17 they have every right to do. They can take a supplementary 
18 hearing, through supplementary proceedings, find out what the 
19 assets are, and they can execute on the contract, and take the 
20 Barkers' position. And once they are in that position, then 
21 they can demand payment from Dianne Hodge. 
22 One of the cases that was ciited by the defendant is 
23 an Oregon case by the name of May vs. Emerson. In that 
24 particular case — it is again mentioned in both memoranda —• 
25 and it has been utilized by the defendants to support their 
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position that the judgment debtor — judgment creditor has a 
lien on the real property — but the remainder of the case 
says, yes, he does have a lien, but in order to get the 
contract buyer to make the payments to the judgment creditor, 
the judgment creditor has to put himself in a position of a 
contract seller. He has to execute on the contract, and put 
himself into the position of the seller. Then he can demand 
payments from the buyer. If the buyer happens to pay off the 
contract prior to the time that the judgment creditor places 
himself in a position of the seller, so be it. It is not the 
buyer's responsibility to collect money for the judgment 
creditor. 
THE COURT: Anything further? 
MR. PIPELLA: I think we have talked about 
everything I had in mind, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Response? 
MR. LYBBERT: Just briefly, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Answer the Court's question posed to 
Counsel. If the Court rules in favor of the Cannefaxes, as a 
practical matter how is the case going to unravel? 
MR. LYBBERT: There is no more remedy. As of the 
day after that closing, back in September of 1985, when the 
money was disbursed, unless their judgment lien had some 
value, they really had no further remedy, the Barkers — this 
is not in the stipulated facts, either, but they are now with 
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bankruptcy, no way to go back against them, look to them for 
further relief. I didn't quite follow how Mr, Pipella 
suggested that we go after the Hodgds. 
THE COURT: Nor did the Court. 
MR. LYBBERT: They sold their interest. She sold 
her interest, I should say. I think there is no more remedy 
for the Clements. 
THE COURT: Counsel, you a^e just ready to say 
something. 
MR. PIPELLA: I am. I am £orry. 
MR. LYBBERT: I would be glad to let him interrupt. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. We have allowed an hour for 
the hearing. The Court anticipates that the ruling today is 
going to be dispositive of all of th£ issues. Let's resolve 
it to your satisfaction as far as argument goes. 
MR. PIPELLA: I think what prompted me to want to 
say something was the remedy against Hodge. I don't think 
that there is a remedy against the Hedges. I think the remedy 
for the Clements was always against tjhe Barkers, except they 
had received payment from Dianne Hodge prior to executing on 
the contract and placing, themselves in the Barkers1 position. 
THE COURT: They become a conduit, a legal conduit 
for the Clements to go against the Hodges, and if that legal 
conduit is now insulated by a bankruptcy, then they have no 
remedy against Hodge. 
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MR. PIPELLA: Hodge paid all of the money. She paid 
in full, in August of 1985. And the Barkers got the money. 
The issue is now the defendants are seeking to enforce their 
lien against the real property. 
THE COURT: The Court understands that. If the 
Court rules in favor of the Cannefaxes today, then what do the 
Clements do to obtain satisfaction on the $54,000 judgment? 
And talk about that for a moment as you argue to the Court the 
purpose of recording statutes. What is the underlying purpose 
of the recording statutes in this state? 
MR. PIPELLA: The statute 78-22-1 specifies at the 
time the judgment is docketed that the judgment is on all of 
the real property owned by the debtor. And if — and when 
someone — when you have — I am going to argue in the 
hypothetical here, because I don't think the Barkers had a 
real property interest at the time the judgment was 
docketed — when that judgment is docketed, it becomes a lien 
on all the real property. When somebody else buys the 
property from the judgment creditor, or makes a loan to the 
judgment creditor, it is put on notice — 
THE COURT: It is subject to a lien. 
MR. PIPELLA: But my position is that Dianne Hodge 
bought the property from the Barkers four years prior, and 
became the owner at the time that she bought the property, and 
the only reason we are having this discussion is over the 
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financing method that was chosen by the parties at closing. 
If there had been an all-inclusive note and deed of trust 
utilized or if the Barkers had taken a third note, a note 
secured by a third deed of trust, we wouldn't be having this 
argument, this discussion, and my position is that the 
contract is just like a note and a mortgage. It is a security 
instrument. The fact that the judgment was docketed doesn't 
affect Dianne Hodgefs interest in the real property. 
THE COURT: Counsel? 
MR. LYBBERT: Is there a Question pending? 
THE COURT: Do you have anything else you would like 
to say? 
MR. LYBBERT: Yes. The fact is that they didn't/5«f] 
sell this property by contract. By doing so, they retained 
legal title. I really, truly believe the supreme court has 
spoken to the matter, Butler vs. Wilkinson case, where they 
clearly recognized the existence and the validity of a 
judgment lien against the vendor's Remaining interest. They 
say — let me quote this again, sincle we do have a little 
time. "Nor for that matter is a judgment lien against the 
vendor's interest extinguished by thle vendor's sale of that 
interest." By definition, a judgmenlt lien only attaches to 
real property, not personal property. Therefore, when the 
Butler opinion refers to a judgment lien against the vendor's 
interest, it necessarily refers to ah interest in real 
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property. 
Therefore, the supreme court is saying that the 
vendor in fact does retain an ownership interest in real 
property, and not just a security interest, at least as 
between — when you bring this third party, this judgment 
creditor into the situation, as between a two-party situation 
where the only two interests you are talking about is that of 
the vendor and the vendee, then application of this doctrine 
of equitable conversion may and frequently is found to be 
perfectly appropriate. But when you are talking about the 
interest of a third person, then you are not going to 
automatically apply that doctrine of equitable conversion. In 
this case you certainly don't. 
We are not asking, we are not suggesting that we are 
entitled to foreclose up to the full amount of the value of 
the property or even up to the judgment amount. What we think 
we are entitled to is that amount that was due, not even on 
the date that the judgment was docketed, but on the date a 
month later when the double closing occurred and Barkers gave 
title, gave a deed to Clement, and Clement gave a deed to the 
Cannefaxes. That's the date we are looking to, to determine 
what interest Barkers still had that was subject to this 
judgment lien. That amount is the $54,000 we talked about in 
the memorandum. 
Mr. Pipella has cited some cases where the Utah 
24 
1 court has applied the doctrine of equity conversion. In each 
2 of those cases it is a case of looking between the vendor and 
3 the vendee how you are going to characterize the vendor's 
4 interest. Those cases, which have considered the issue we are 
5 talking about today, whether the judgment lien attaches to the 
6 vendor's interest, have acknowledged the existence of the 
7 doctrine of equity conversion and s^id we are not going to 
8 apply it in this case. It is an equitable doctrine, not to be 
9 applied in every instance, and almost without exception. 
10 There are cases that have just flat but, without much 
11 analysis, said the judgment lien doesn't attach to a vendor's 
12 remaining interest. The majority rule, as I have stated, I 
13 have quoted in my memorandum from Am1 Jur, is — 
14 THE COURT: Is this in yout reply? 
15 MR. LY3BERT: No. It is in my initial memorandum. 
16 THE COURT: What page? 
17 MR. LYBBERT: 46 Am Jur 2nd. 
18 THE COURT: Which page? 
19 MR. LYBBERT: Page 5 of my original memorandum. 
20 THE COURT: All right. 
21 MR. LYBBERT: Have you rea<$ that? 
2 2 THE COURT: Yes. 
23 MR. LYBBERT: I will submit it, your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: Submit? Or el^e forever hold your 
25 peace. You have whatever opportunity you would like to 
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1 respond. The Court has relaxed considerably this morning its 
2 customary rules on arguing motions for summary judgment, 
3 because the Court's ruling this morning is going to be 
4 determinative of the case, and you should have every 
5 opportunity, both of you, to argue whatever you would like, 
6 irrespective of the standard format in these matters. What is 
7 your client1s remedy, as a practical matter, if the Court 
8 rules against him? 
9 MR. PIPELLA: Your Honor, the client's remedy is 
10 probably a claim against the title insurance. 
11 THE COURT: And the Court keeps coming back to that 
12 position in its attempt to rule properly on this case. What 
13 is the underlying purpose of a recording statute? And if that 
14 in fact does not put the owner — or the buyer, rather, or the 
15 buyer's agent on notice that there is a cloud on title and a 
16 contingency ought to be made to remove* that cloud, then the 
17 recording statutes really have no eff€»ct. 
18 MR. PIPELLA: Your Honor, and I agree. But all of 
19 my comments have been made that the Beirkers simply did not 
20 have an interest to which the lien attached at the time the 
21 judgment was docketed. It was a personal property interest. 
22 They were mortgagees. 
23 THE COURT: Would your argument be any stronger if 
24 the dispute were between the original buyer and the original 
25 seller as opposed to a third party now, as Counsel has 
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alluded? 
MR. PIPELLA: Your Honor, if — the application of 
equitable conversion between the seller and the buyer has 
always applied to a third party. In the cases that have been 
cited, in Butler, we are looking at a third-party judgment 
creditor. In the Kartchner case, we use the State Tax 
Commission as an adverse party, depending on whether or not 
the seller's interest was held to be personal or real 
property. It always applied to a third party, as between the 
seller and the buyer. If no third p£rty ever makes a claim or 
there is no possibility that a third party would make a claim, 
then there is no need to argue that equitable conversion has 
taken place. The argument is there to protect the buyer 
against potential claims made against his seller, in order to 
protect him, to give him, the buyers tne benefit of the 
bargain, the benefit of his bargain; 
MR. LYBBERT: One last wo|:d, your Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. LYBBERT: In the Butler vs. Wilkinson case, they 
considered the doctrine of equitably conversion and found it 
applicable in order to find that a judgment lien could attach 
to the vendee's interest. That certainly doesn't mean that — 
it just doesn't mean there is only one of those two interests 
that a judgment lien can attach to. In this case it is easy 
to separate and determine, and we stipulated what the vendor's 
27 
interest was, financially speaking, and what the vendee's 
interest was. The vendor's interest was that $54,000 that was 
still owed him at the time of this closing in September of 
1985. The doctrine of equitable conversion is just that. It 
is equitable doctrine. If it is equitable to apply it, it is 
notVapplied. If there are no strong equities, it is not 
applied. In this case there is no strong equity. 
THE COURT: The Court will take a ten-minute recess. 
The Court has read all the pleadings in support of and in 
opposition to the motion. We will take a ten-minute recess 
and return and make a ruling. 
(Court was in recess.) 
THE COURT: The record will reflect the court is 
back in session. Having read the memos in support of and in 
opposition to the defendants1 motion for summary judgment — 
is that the only issue before the Court? 
MR. PIPELLA: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: The Court looks carefully at a number of 
facts and legal and equitable principles in this case, and 
observes as follows: Should the doctrine of equitable 
conversion apply? If so, what facts are persuasive in so 
ruling? The Court notes that when the Barkers gave a warranty 
deed to Dianne Hodge, after the Clements1 judgment against the 
Barkers had been docketed, that Dianne Hodge had construtive 
notice of the existence of the judgment lien, and so did the 
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plaintiffs. Prior to recording of the deeds from Barkers to 
Hodge, and from Hodge to Cannefax, Security Title Agency did a 
title search, and discovered the recorded judgment by 
Clements. As of that date, the Cannefaxes, through their 
agent, not only had constructive notice but they had actual 
notice that the judgment existed against the property. 
The Court suggests that a reasonable course of 
action would have been for the Cannefaxes to have insisted 
that the judgment lien be cleared it the time they purchased 
the property. Then Security Title could have either excepted 
that judgment lien from its coverage or made other 
arrangements to remove the cloud on title. Instead, they 
ignored the judgment, they bound the title insurance on the 
property, and they recorded the de^ds. 
Now, the question is, if the Court is to be 
persuaded to rule under equitable dloctrines, what is or what 
isn't equitable? Who was in the better position to anticipate 
the ultimate implications of that cloud on title, and to deal 
with it at the time of purchase of the property by the 
plaintiffs in this case? The Court feels and is persuaded by 
the Butler vs. Wilkinson erase that States, in part, "A vendee 
who voluntarily assigns or sells his equitable interest to a 
third person does not by that assignment or sale extinguish a 
creditor's judgment lien that attached during the vendee's 
ownership of the equitable interest in the property, nor is a 
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1 judgment lien against the vendor's interest extinguished by 
2 the vendor's sale of that interest to a third person." 
3 The Court rules that the contract vendor in fact 
4 does retain an interest in real property, and so rules that 
5 that was the case in the case before the Court. Based on the 
6 facts stipulated, argument of counsel, the law cited, it is 
7 the ruling of the Court that, according to the terms and 
8 conditions and amounts heretofore stipulated by the defendant, 
9 that summary judgment is granted to the defendant, 
10 Counsel, the Court appreciates a scholarly and 
11 exhaustive approach to the briefing of these issues. It is 
12 the type of case where, because of the complexity of the 
13 issues, because of the implications of the ruling, the Court 
14 appreciates the professional and thorough approach to this 
15 matter by both counsel. The defendant is ordered to prepare a 
16 written order consistent with the Court's ruling, submit it to 
I • 
17 the Court for signature and filing with the Clerk of the Court 
18 on or before the 5th day of March, 1988, 12 noon. Court is in 
19 recess. 
20 I (This proceeding was concluded.) 
21 
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Telephone: (801) 328-2506 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RAYMOND P.L. CANNEFAX and DEBRA ] 
CANNEFAX, 
Plaintiffs/ } 
vs. ] 
DONALD W. CLEMENT and RUTH L. ] 
CLEMENT, 
Defendants. ] 
ORDER AND SUMMARY 
) JUDGMENT 
1 Civil No. C87-6232 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment/ praying for 
judgment in their favor and against plaintiffs on the Complaint 
on file herein and for judgment in their favor and against 
plaintiffs on the Counterclaim on file herein/ came on regularly 
for hearing on February 29/ 1988 before The Honorable Pat B. 
Brian/ District Judge. Plaintiffs appeared by their attorney, 
Rodney M. Pipella. Defendants appeared by their attorney/ Steven 
H. Lybbert. The court has considered the $tipulated Facts, 
defendants1 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment/ plaintiffs1 Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Opposition to Defendants1 Motion for Summary 
Judgment/ and defendants1 Reply to Plaintiffs1 Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment/ all of 
which are on file herein/ and court has heard the oral arguments 
of counsel. Having considered the above pleadings and oral 
argument/ and good cause appearing/ 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants1 Motion for 
Summary Judgment is granted; and 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
judgment be, and hereby is; entered in favor of defendants and 
against plaintiffs on the Complaint on file herein, and the 
Complaint is hereby dismissed; and 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. As a matter of law, a contract vendor of real 
property does retain an interest in the real property which is 
subject to the lien of a judgment against him, 
2. When defendants1 Judgment against George W. Barker, 
Jr. and Lila Mr. Barker was docketed with the Clerk of the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County on August 19, 1985, 
that Judgment created a valid lien against the property at 2563 
East Lockhart Road in Salt Lake County, Utah, which property is 
more particularly described in paragraph 5 of the Verified 
Complaint herein. 
3. In this case, in light of Stipulated Fact No. 14, 
it is equitable that the judgment lien created when said Judgment 
was docketed in Salt Lake County bound the property to the extent 
of the amount unpaid on the Uniform Real Estate Contract between 
the Barkers, as sellers, and Diane Hodge, as buyer, on September 
25, 1985, (the date Diane Hodge received a warranty deed from the 
Barkers and gave a warranty deed to plaintiffs), less the amount 
of the prior encumbrances on the property in favor of Prudential 
Federal Savings & Loan Association and Continental Bank and Trust 
Company°, to wit/ the judgment lien bound the Lockhart Road 
property in the sum of $54/464.94, 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the temporary injunction in 
effect in this case should be
 f and hereby is# dissolved. 
Dated this | day of March/ 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
Tjhe /Hon. Pat B. Brian 
D i s t r i c t Judge 
Approved as to form: 
M 
Rodhey M. Pipella 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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Raymond P. L. Cannefax and Debra 
Cannefax. 
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Donald W. Clement and Ruth L. 
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OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 890292-CA 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Pat B. Brian 
F I L E D 
FEB/ 21990 
^tl^ck of m« Court 
UWh C*urt * Appeals 
Attorneys: Rodney M. Pipella, Salt Lake City, for Appellants 
Steven H. Lybbert/ Salt Lake City, for Respondents 
Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Bullock.1 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Raymond and Debra Cannefax ("Cannefaxes") appeal a summary 
judgment entered against them in their quiet title action and in 
favor of Donald and Ruth Clement ("Clements"). In granting 
summary judgment, the court held that a seller's retained legal 
title to real property under an executory land sale contract was 
-real property- and, therefore, that a judgment docketed by the 
Clements, the seller's creditors, was a lien against the property 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1 (1987). We reverse. 
George W. Barker, Jr. and Lila M. Barker ("Barkers") were fee 
simple owners of the Lockhart Road Property at issue in this quiet 
title action. In 1981, the Barkers entered into a uniform real 
estate contract to sell their property to.Diane Hodge ("Ms. 
Hodge") for $160,000. Ms. Hodge paid $40,000 to the Barkers at 
the time of the sale and she was to pay the balance over the 
contract term. On August 31, 1981, Ms. Hodge recorded a notice of 
her uniform real estate contract. 
1. J. Robert Bullock, Senior District Judge, sitting by special 
appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) (1989). 
Four years later, the Clements obtained a judgment against 
the Barkers for $70,526 which was docketed in August 1985. The 
stipulated facts show no attempt by the Clements to execute 
against the Barkers' retained interest in the Lockhart Road 
Property nor any attempt to garnish the proceeds Ms. Hodge paid 
to the Barkers during the executory period of the uniform real 
estate contract. 
On September 25, 1985, Ms. Hodge paid the remaining amount 
due under her uniform real estate contract with the Barkers, 
satisfied prior obligations on the Lockhart Road Property, and 
the Barkers deeded the property to her. At the same meeting, Ms. 
Hodge sold the property to the Cannefaxes and gave them a 
warranty deed to the Lockhart Road Property. After the dual 
closings were completed, Surety Title conducted a title search 
which disclosed the Clements' judgment docketed against the 
Barkers. This is the first mention in the stipulated facts of 
any actual knowledge of the Clements' judgment. 
Subsequently, the Clements obtained a writ of execution 
against the Lockhart Road Property then owned in fee simple by 
the Cannefaxes. In response, the Cannefaxes brought this quiet 
title acticm. 
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Clements, holding their judgment was a lien on the Lockhart Road 
Property to the extent of $54,464.94, the amount which remained 
unpaid on the uniform real estate contract between their judgment 
debtors, the Barkers, and Ms. Hodge on September 25, 1985, the 
date the Barkers deeded Ms. Hodge the property. 
We find the trial court's ruling contrary to the doctrine of 
equitable conversion which is the law in Utah. Under the 
doctrine of equitable conversion, once parties have entered into 
a binding and enforceable land sale contract, the buyer's 
interest in the contract is said to be real property and the 
seller's retained interest is characterized as personal 
property. R. Cunningham, W. Stoebuck, & D. Whitman, The Law of 
Property § 10.13, at 698 (1984). The rights of the parties are 
evaluated as if the conveyance had been made. H. McClintock, 
McClintock on Equity § 106, at 284 (1948) [hereinafter 
"McClintock on Equity"]. 
The Utah Supreme Court first adopted the doctrine of 
equitable conversion in Allred v. Allred, 15 Utah 2d 396, 393 
P.2d 791 (1964). The court characterized the seller's interest 
under a land sale contract as personalty, stating, "[a]s a 
general rule an enforceable executory contract of sale has the 
effect of converting the interest of the vendor of real property 
to personalty.- 393 P.2d at 792. Again in In re Estate of 
Willson, 28 Utah 2d 197, 499 P.2d 1298 (1972), the court clearly 
held that the interest of a seller under a land sale contract was 
personal property, not real property, for inheritance tax 
purposes. 499 P.2d at 1300-01. 
The court applied the doctrine of equitable conversion in a 
condemnation context in Jelco v. Third Judicial Dist. Court, 29 
Utah 2d 472, 511 P.2d 739 (1973). In Jelco, both the buyer and 
the seller under an executory land sale contract claimed a right 
to the increase in value of the land which had been condemned. 
The court held the buyer was the owner of the land, and thus he 
was entitled to the .condemnation proceeds. 511 P.2d at 741. In^ 
describing the status of the vendor under the contract the court 
stated, "the vendor . . . has only legal title. In regard to the 
purchase price, what he is entitled to is to have it paid in 
accordance with the terms of the contract." XcL. See also Bill 
Nay & Sons Excavating v. Neelev Consfcr. C|D . , 677 P.2d 1120, 1121 
(Utah 1984) ("The interest of a purchaser under a real estate 
contract is an interest in real property. . . . " ) . 
Contrary to the claims made by the dissent, the Utah Supreme 
Court has consistently applied the doctrine of equitable 
conversion characterizing the seller's interest under an 
executory land sale contract as personal property and the buyer's 
interest as real property.2 
The Utah Supreme Court recently applied the doctrine of 
equitable conversion in determining the rights of judgment 
creditors under an executory land sale contract in Butler v. 
Wilkinson/ 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987). In Butler, the court 
squarely held that the buyer's interest under the executory land 
sale contract was an interest in real property to which judgment 
liens could attach. Justice Stewart stated: "The doctrine of 
2. The dissent ignores the previous precedent, and rather 
relies upon its interpretation of Reynolds v. Van Wagoner, 592 
P.2d 593 (Utah 1979), claiming the Utah court chose not to apply 
the doctrine of equitable conversion in this case because "it 
would have led to an inequitable result inconsistent with the 
contractual intent of the parties." We disagree with the 
dissent's reading of this case. The Utah Supreme Court in 
Reynolds did not utilize the doctrine of equitable conversion 
because the case focused on abandonment df contractual rights 
not equitable conversion. X£. at 594. 
equitable conversion characterizes the seller's interest as an 
interest in personalty and not as one in realty, whereas the 
vendee's interest under the executory contract is deemed an 
interest in realty," X&. at 1255. Further clarifying the 
doctrine of equitable conversion as it affects judgment 
creditors, he continued: 
Under the doctrine of equitable 
conversion, a vendee under a uniform real 
estate contract obtains an equitable 
interest in the land itself, even though 
the vendor retains the legal title. The 
vendee is said to convert the monetary 
interest that he has in the property to an 
interest in real estate so that he may 
invoke the powers of an equity court to 
compel specific performance of the real 
estate contract, By a parity of 
reasoning, the vendor under such a 
contract is deemed to have converted his 
interest in the land that is the subject 
of the contract to a monetary ox legal 
interest . . . . 
Id. at n.5 (emphasis added). The court further detailed the 
nature of the interest retained by the seller under a land sale 
contract, stating: 
Under an installment land sale 
contract, the vendor retains legal title 
as security for the purchase price of the 
property* Oaks v. Kendall, 23 Cal. App. 
2d 715, 73 P.2d 1255 (1937); Marks v. City 
Of Tucumcarj, 93 N.M. 4, 595 P.2d 1199 
(1979). Nevertheless, as a general 
proposition, the vendee is treated as the 
owner of the land . . . . 
The vendor's interest is similar to 
the security interest of a purchase money 
mortgagee. 
Xd. at 1254-55 (emphasis added) 
The supreme court in Butler concluded the buyer under a 
binding executory land sale contract has an interest in real 
property to which judgment liens may attach as to any other 
real property interest but subject to the seller•s prior lien, 
"By a parity of reasoning," the court concluded that the 
seller's interest under the contract is merely the right to 
receive the proceeds under the contract secured by his retained 
legal title similar to the "security interest of a purchase 
money mortgage," XdL- at 1255. 
In Butler, Justice Stewart relied upon Marks v. Citv of 
Tucumcari, 93 N.M. 4, 595 P.2d 1199 (1979)- In Marks, the New 
Mexico court applied the doctrine of equitable conversion and 
held that the interest retained by the vendor under a land sale 
contract is personalty and not real estate, and thus that a 
judgment docketed by a creditor of the seller during the 
executory period of the contract had no effect on the interest 
of a subsequent purchaser of the property, 595 P.2d 1201-02. 
The dissent claims Butler supports its holding that a 
judgment lien docketed against the seller's interest under a 
uniform real estate contract survives as L^ lien against the 
land even though all proceeds have previously been paid to the 
judgment debtor-seller under the contract and the property has 
been deeded to a subsequent purchaser for value. We disagree. 
The dissent relies on the following language from Butler: 
"[the seller has] a contract right to . . . take back the 
vendee's interests if the vendee defaults. The vendor also has 
an interest . . . measured by the amount the vendee owes under 
the contract." Butler, 740 P.2d at 1255 (citation omitted). 
This language is consistent with our view of the nature of-the 
seller's retained interest, not the dissent's. The seller has 
retained legal title as security to insure that he or she 
receives the payments due under the contract; if the buyer 
should default, the seller's title will not be released to the 
buyer. This is the extent of the seller's retained 
interest—which, under the doctrine of equitable conversion, is 
not in the nature of real property such that liens can attach 
under section 78-22-1. 
This court's recent decision in Lach v. Deseret Bank, 746 
P.2d 802 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), adopts our reading of fiuilsi. 
In dicta, this court concluded that a judgment lien docketed 
against a seller's interest under a uniform real estate 
contract did not affect the rights of the buyer under that 
contract. J&. at 805. Our language that "no judgment lien can 
be created by a judgment docketed against a seller after the 
AQn9Q9_rA c 
seller executes a binding earnest money contract," id., 
however, needs amplification. The docketed judgment does not 
become a lien under the statute because the seller's retained 
legal title is not real property. 
We believe Utah authority supports the following analysis 
of this case. The Barkers entered into a uniform real estate 
contract to sell the Lockhart Road Property to Ms. Hodge before 
the Clements docketed their judgment. Under the doctrine of 
equitable conversion, the Barkers retained only bare legal 
title to the property as security to receive the payment of the 
proceeds due from Ms. Hodge under the contract. Thus, the 
Clements' docketed judgment did not create a judgment lien 
against the Lockhart Road Property. 
The three jurisdictions relied upon by the dissent, 
Nebraska, Idaho and Oregon, have held that a judgment creditor 
of a contract seller will be given a lien in the property to 
the extent of the unpaid amounts due under the contract. 
Monroe v. Lincoln Citv Employees Credit Union, 203 Neb. 702, 
279 N.W.2d 866, 868 (1979); First Sec. Bank v. Rogers, 91 Idaho 
654, 429 P.2d 386, 389 (1967); Heider v. Dietz, 234 Or. 105, 
380 P.2d 619, 624 (1963) (en banc). This rule has been 
qualified, however, to allow a purchaser to continue to make 
payments pursuant to his contract until he is given actual 
notice of the judgment lien. The buyer is not required to 
search the records before he makes his payments under the 
contract. Lacy, Creditors of Land Contract Vendors, 24 Case W. 
Res. L. Rev. 645, 647 (1973) [hereinafter -Lacy, 24 Case W. 
Res. L. Rev. 645"].; Simpson, Legislative Changes in the Law of 
Equitable Conversion bv Contract, 44 Yale L.J. 559, 578 (1935) 
[hereinafter "Simpson, 44 Yale L.J. 559H]. Furthermore, any 
lien acquired by the judgment creditor is "discharged by 
payment of the balance of the purchase money due although less 
than the amount of the judgment." 1x1.; see also 3 Am. Law Real 
Property § 11.29, at 86 (A. Casner ed. 1952) [hereinafter "3 
Am. Law Real Property-]. 
Thus, not even the "rule" relied upon by the dissent 
supports its position. There are no facts in the record to 
support a finding that Ms. Hodge had actual notice of the 
Clements1 judgment before she paid all proceeds due the Barkers 
as sellers under the contract. 
Furthermore, the rule relied upon by the dissent is not the 
majority rule, nor the rule in.Utah. The following 
jurisdictions have held that a judgment lien against the 
seller's interest is not an encumbrance on the buyer's property 
interest under a land sale contract: Marks v. City of 
Tucumcari, 93 N.M. 4, 595 P.2d 1199, 1202 (1979); Mueller v. 
Novelty Dye Works, 273 Wis. 501, 78 N.W.2d 881, 884 (1956); 
Stecker v. Snyder, 118 Colo. 153, 193 P.2d 881, 884 (1948); 
Snow Bros. Hardware Co. v. Ellis, 180 Ark. 238, 21 S.W.2d 162, 
163 (1929); S32. also Simpson, 44 Yale L.J. 559, 579 nrx.132, 133 
and cases cited therein. 
More importantly, all of these vintage cases dealing with 
creditor's rights under an executory land sale contract turned 
on the peculiar facts presented and do not undertake a reasoned 
discussion of the application of the doctrine of equitable 
conversion in dealing with third party creditors. Of more 
assistance are the commentators who have written on the topic. 
These commentators criticize the- approach taken by the dissent 
and approve the one advocated herein. 
Discussing the conceptual framework created by the doctrine 
of equitable conversion in the judgment creSitor context, one 
author states: 
The rights of creditors of the vendor or 
purchaser to reach the interest of their 
debtor in the land contracted to be sold 
or purchased depend in large part on the 
theory of equitable conversion.' Since on 
that theory, the purchaser is regarded as 
owner of the land and debtor for the 
purchase money and the vendor as holding 
legal title as security for payment by the 
purchaser, it logically follows that 
creditors of the purchaser should be able 
to reach the land subject to the vendor's 
lien thereon, while creditors of the 
vendor should be able to reach the land 
only to the extent of the vendor's 
security intgrgst. 
3 Am. Law Real Property § 11.29, at 83 (emphasis added). See 
also McClintock on Equity § 106, at 286. 
Several commentators have explicitly endorsed the cases 
that refuse to.allow a vendor's judgment creditors to acquire a 
lien as against the purchaser under an executory land sale 
contract even though the purchase price is unpaid and the 
purchaser has actual knowledge of the judgment lien. 3 Am. Law 
Real Property § 11.29, at 86; Simpson, 44 tale L.J. 559, 579; 
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Lacy, 24 Case W. Res. L. Rev, 645, 662, "This works no 
injustice upon the creditors, who may proceed by garnishment to 
reach the purchase money or by bill for equitable execution to 
reach both purchase money and vendor's lien." 3 Am. Law Real 
Property § 11.29, at 86. Another commentator states: 
[I]t is difficult to see why the 
purchaser's knowledge of a judgment 
against . . . his vendor, should impose 
upon him the necessity of paying otherwise 
than in accordance with his contract. 
Some courts have held, and, it would seem 
with sound reason, that the vendor's 
judgment creditors acquire no lien as 
against the purchaser even though the 
purchase price is unpaid and the purchaser 
knows of the judgment. This works no 
injustice on the creditor, who may proceed 
by garnishment to reach the purchase money 
or by bill for equitable execution to 
reach both purchase money and the vendor's 
lien. 
Simpson, 44 Yale L.J. 559, 579 (footnotes omitted). 
Still another scholar concludes that even if one considers 
that the seller's judgment creditor's lien can attach, the 
creditor should not have any right to receive payments upon 
mere attachment of a judgment lien but only upon an execution 
sale. Lacy, 24 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 645, 662. 
The dissent also alludes to several policy considerations 
which it claims support its holding. We discuss each in turn. 
The dissent rejects application of the doctrine of equitable 
conversion under a uniform real estate contract claiming that 
it "is hardly what most parties to a real estate sale contract 
have in mind. The more straightforward notion of such a 
contract envisions the land as changing hands only after the 
price is paid." However, executory land sale contracts are 
used by and are generally intended by the parties as long term 
financing devices similar to mortagages or trust deeds. 
Therefore, it is not inconsistent that the effect of a judgment 
docketed against the seller under a uniform real estate 
contract should be the same as one docketed against a 
mortagagee or trust deed beneficiary. 'Furthermore, there are 
absolutely no facts to support.the dissent's view of the 
parties' intentions in this case. The dissent candidly admits 
that the Barkers did not intend that their judgment creditors 
could acquire a superior position to their buyer, Ms. Hodge, 
under the uniform real estate contract. 
The dissent further admits that -[e]nabling creditors to 
have access to the seller's title to the property may lessen 
somewhat the predictability of real estate transactions." 
However, it answers this concern by chiding Professor Langdell 
and his disciples for espousing certainty and predictability in 
legal doctrines. We believe there is no better place for 
Professor Langdell's "legal geometry" and predictability than 
in the transfer of real property and its effect on innocent 
third parties who must rely on some bright-line rule. 
The dissent concludes the problems created for contract 
buyers by its rule are not substantial as "a prudent buyer can 
still assure his title by checking the judgment docket to 
determine if creditors' claims exist." We believe the dissent 
places an unreasonable burden on the buyer, one that for 
practical purposes will destroy the commercial feasibility of 
property sales by long-term contracts. Ui^ der the dissent's 
view, a buyer would be required to check the judgment docket 
before making each monthly payment to the seller. We believe 
the burden is more equitably placed on the judgment creditor 
who can enforce his judgment under Utah R. Civ. P. 64C, 64D or 
69. 
Finally, we do not see how the "equities," as claimed by 
the dissent, are with the Clements as judgment creditors in 
this case. The issue is not whether the Clements should have 
recourse on their judgment but rather the procedural form of 
their remedy and the person who can be compelled to satisfy 
their judgment. It was the Clements who sat on their rights 
failing to pursue their remedies. It is not inequitable that 
as a result they cannot collect their judgment against a 
subsequent innocent purchaser.3 
3. There are no allegations that the Cannefaxes as buyers acted 
in bad faith in purchasing the property at issue. For cases 
where "sweetheart- contractual deals are entered into to defraud 
creditors, there is a remedy available under the Utah Fraudulent 
Transfer Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-6-1 to -13 (1989). 
In conclusion, we reverse the summary judgment granted to 
the Clements and order the trial court to enter summary 
judgment in favor of the Cannefaxes quieting title to the 
Lockhart Road Property in them. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
JACKSON, Judge (concurring): 
The doctrine of equitable conversion runs counter to some 
real property law concepts and my law practice observations of 
the expectations of parties to real estate deals. If I had 
been involved in the decisions to take the route leading to 
adoption of the doctrine, I would not have favored the trip. 
At this point, there is no junction, and the principle of stare 
decisis requires that we continue the journey until our supreme 
court chooses to change course. In the meantime, we need to 
maintain a stable direction in the law for the benefit of those 
involved in real estate transactions. 
^4^2^' 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
BULLOCK, Judge (dissenting): 
I respectfully dissent. As a general proposition, I do not 
have great difficulty in applying the doctrine of equitable 
conversion to the buyer's interest under a installment land 
sale contract. I do, however, have insurmountable difficulty 
in applying it to the seller's interest to the extent that the 
purchase price is unpaid, which is the result under the 
majority opinion. I would, therefore, hold precisely opposite 
to my esteemed colleagues and affirm the district court. 
This case was heard in the district court on stipulated 
facts and dismissed on a motion for summary judgment. From the 
limited scope of those proceedings, the single issue before the 
district court and on appeal is whether a contract seller's 
retained title is real property to which judgment creditors' 
liens can attach pursuant to section 78-22-1 to the extent ot 
the unpaid price, or whether that title is personalty by reason 
of the doctrine of equitable conversion, jto which judgment 
creditors' liens cannot attach- The majority's conclusion that 
the seller's retained title is personalty appears to me to be 
contrary to the case law generally, to rujfi counter to public 
policy, to presume facts not in evidence, and is based upon 
grounds never argued here or below. I respectfully opine that 
the majority misinterprets the applicable case law in Utah and 
most other jurisdictions and reaches a result that has nothing 
to recommend it in terms of public policy, other than the 
pursuit of purely theoretical symmetry, that is to say, that if 
the buyer's interest might be regarded as personal property, 
then it invariably must follow for reasons of symmetry that the 
seller's interest is personal property, even though the seller 
has not been fully paid and has not parted with title. I 
explain first how the majority's opinion conflicts with the 
relevant Utah cases, and then turn to considerations of public 
policy. 
Utah Case Law on Equitable Conversion 
A Utah appellate court has never squarely held, until this 
case," that a judgment against the seller and duly docketed as 
section 78-1-22 provides does not create a lien against the 
seller's legal title to land agreed to be .sold under an 
executory installment contract because the seller's retained 
title was not real property. There are cases in which the 
Supreme Court has relied on the doctrine of equitable 
conversion in very different contexts; for example, in holding 
that the seller of property later condemned was entitled only 
to the contract amount-*- or in holding that the seller's 
interest was taxable as personal property,2 However> the 
interests at stake in estate taxation and eminent domain are 
very different from those at stake in debtor-creditor 
relations, and the majority's references to dicta restating the 
notion of equitable conversion in such cases provide no 
compelling reason for applying equitable conversion to preclude 
a judgment lien. The purely obiter recitations of the general 
1. Jelco, Inc. v. Third Judicial District Court. 29 Utah 2d 
472, 511 P.2d 739 (1973). 
2. Willson v. State Tax Commission. 28 Utah 2d 197, 499 P.2d 
1298 (1972). 
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concept of equitable conversion are no authority for applying 
it here. Mere definition of a concept does not justify its 
application; we could as well define a judgment lien and 
thereupon insist on vindicating the lien in this case. 
The most thorough elucidation to date by the Utah Supreme 
Court of the scope and limits of equitable conversion is found 
in Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987). A footnote 
in Butler at page 25, quoted in the majority opinion, defines 
the concept of equitable conversion, and it is upon that 
definition that the majority principally relies. However, 
Butler stops far short of requiring equitable conversion in 
every conceivable instance, and, in my analysis of it, 
concludes contrary to the majority opinion in this case.3 
Butler clearly holds that the buyer's interest is real property 
to which a judgment lien attaches subject to the seller's 
retained legal title,4 but it is not all-encompassing in 
forcing universal adoption and application of the "parity of 
reasoning" for which the majority contends. The main point of 
the majority opinion seems to be that, because the buyer's 
interest is real property, the seller's interest must 
"logically" be personal property. However, Butler's 
description of the "parity of reasoning," the logical symmetry 
that underlies equitable conversion, is not an unqualified, 
universal endorsement of it. 
Butler's general, introductory restatement of the concept 
of equitable conversion is, according to Butler itself, not a 
universal verity that must be applied slavishly in every 
conceivable instance, without regard to the merits of such an 
application. Butler recognizes that equitable conversion 
results in a characterization of the buyer that "is not wholly 
3. Butler accordingly squares with the law of most 
jurisdictions that have considered the question. See, e.g., 
First Security Bank v. Rogers, 91 Idaho 654, 429 P.2d 386 (1967) 
("The majority rule is that a judgment lien against a vendor 
after the making of the contract of sale extends to all of the 
vendor's interest remaining in the land and binds the land to 
the extent of the unpaid purchase price.); Heider v. Deitz. 234 
P.2d 105, 429 P.2d 386 (1967). This majority rule is further 
discussed later in this opinion. 
4. 740 P.2d at 1255-56. 
accurate,'0 and further notes that equitable conversion does 
not prevent a judgment docketed against the seller from 
becoming a lien on the seller's title to the land.^ 
After stating that judgment creditors' liens against a 
buyer's equitable contractual interest are not extinguished by 
an "assignment, sale, or rescission," the Butler opinion 
continues: "Nor for that matter, is a judgment lien against 
the vendor's interest extinguished by the vendor's sale of that 
interest to a third person,"7 The Clements argue, and I 
agree, that this statement clearly shows that the Supreme Court 
considers the seller's retained title to be real property, 
since judgment liens attach only to real property, not to 
personal property, pursuant to section 78^-22-1. 
The majority views the seller's interest as, at most, a 
lien. In this regard, it is true that Butler analogizes the 
seller's interest to a purchase money mortgage, but Butler is 
careful to point out it is really no mere lien; rather, it is 
legal title to the land, albeit subject to a conditional 
promise to convey at a future date.° Legal title to land is 
not only within the definition and plain meaning of "real 
property" in section 78-22-1, but also it is the very archetype 
of what real property is.9 
Butler clearly recognizes that the seller retains legal 
title, and that is where the analytical usefulness of the 
analogy to a lien ends. The seller's retained legal title is 
5. 740 P.2d at 1255. Butler further notes that equitable 
conversion operates to treat the buyer as owner of the land only 
"as a general proposition." I recognize that in many 
situations, it makes good sense to regard the prospective, 
conditional performance of the contract as if it were an 
accomplished fact; however, this case does not present such a 
situation. 
6. "[A] judgment lien against the vendor's interest [is not] 
extinguished by the vendor's sale of that interest to a third 
person." 740 P.2d at 1258. 
7. Butler. 740 P.2d at 1258 (emphasis addpd). 
8. £££ 740 P.2d at 1256 n. 6. 
9. See Restatement of Property § 10 comment c (1936). 
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indeed similar to a lien or mortgage, in that it permits the 
seller to regain the land if the buyer defaults. However, the 
fact that the retained title may function like a lien in 
certain circumstances is far from saying that it is identical 
or equivalent to a lien for all purposes.10 We do not have a 
case here in which a seller recovers property from a delinquent 
buyer, and therefore, the lien analogy has little utility in 
this particular situation. Rather, this is a case in which a 
third party seeks to realize a judgment out of the seller's 
asset, and the legal nature of that asset is the object of our 
inquiry. In this context, it is quite immaterial that the 
buyer could lose his interest in a forfeiture that in some ways 
operates as a lien foreclosure. What is important for present 
purposes is that the Barkers held legal title, and, although 
they had agreed to part with it at a later date if Hodge 
performed her obligations, they still held legal title when the 
Clements docketed their judgment. Consistent with Butler, a 
judgment lien would therefore attach to that title to the 
extent of the unpaid balance,of the contract price. 
In respectful contrast to Judge Jackson's concurring 
opinion, I am convinced that stare decisis does not compel the 
result reached by the majority. Dicta in Lach v. Deseret 
Bank11 may have expressed a view on the subject, but dicta 
are not holding, and only a holding of the court need be 
followed under the principle of stare decisis.12 The precise 
question that is squarely presented in this case was an open 
question in Utah case law until this case. The prior adoption 
in our case law of the general notion of equitable conversion 
does not mean that it must apply in this case; whenever a 
doctrine of such broad scope is embraced, it must be fine-tuned 
10. Justice Stewart clearly recognized the limitations of the 
lien analogy in the Butler opinion when he wrote: "The term 
•vendor's lien' seems to have stuck even though it is 
inaccurately used before the vendor parts with the title. Until 
then, it is not, in fact, a lien at all, but rather a retained 
interest in the land that is derived from the vendor's retention 
of the fee title." 740 P.2d at 1256 n.6. 
11. 746 P.2d 802 (Utah 1988). 
12. Soring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 74 Utah 103, 
277 P. 206, 210 (1929); Salt Lake City v. Sutter, 61 Utah 533, 
216 P. 234, 236-37 (1923). 
and exceptions must be carved out to prevent injustice in the 
many varied applications of the doctrine. Some of the 
limitations on equitable conversion were explained in the 
Butler case, and in the case before us now, Butler clearly 
indicates that equitable conversion should not be applied here. 
Deficiencies in Rationale 
This is the first time a Utah appellate court has squarely 
held that a docketed judgment does not create a lien against 
the seller's retained title to real property under a contract 
of sale. Since we here lay down a precedent, I think it is 
important to examine the rationale and public-policy impacts of 
that holding. 
The doctrine of equitable conversion is the notion that the 
seller of a specifically enforceable contract to convey land is 
deemed to own primarily^-3 an interest in personal property, 
and the buyer's interest under the contract is characterized as 
real property.14 However, while that notion leads to a 
sensible result in some situations, it is important not to lose 
13. The "bare legal title" retained by the seller is sometimes 
said to be held in trust for the buyer, see* e.g., In re 
Hiohberaer's Estate, 360 A.2d 580 (Pa. 1076); In re Krotzsch's 
Estate, 60 111. 2d 342, 326 N.E.2d 758 (1975); Smith v. Tang, 
100 Ariz. 196, 412 P.2d 697 (1966), or to be a constructive lien 
to secure payment of the price, see Oaks v. Kendall. 23 Cal. 
App. 2d 680, 73 P.2d 1255, 1258-59 (1937). The term "lien," 
however, is actually something of a misnomer, as the Utah 
Supreme Court explained in Butler, 740 P.2d at 1256 n.6: 
The term "vendor's lien" . . . is 
inaccurately used before the vendor parts 
with the title. Until then, it is not, in 
fact, a lien at all, but rather a retained 
interest in the land that is derived from 
the vendor's retention of the fee title. 
14. See generally 3 American Law of Property 62-64 (Casner, 
ed., 1952); R. Cunningham, W. Stoebuck & D. Whitman, The Law of 
Property 698-701 (1984); H. McClintock, McClintock on Eouitv 
284-88 (1948); 4 J. Pomeroy & S. Symons, A Treatise on Eouitv 
Jurisprudence 472-80 (1941); 2 J. Story, Commentaries on Eouitv 
Jurisprudence 485-92 (1918). 
sight of the fact that such a characterization of the parties' 
interests is not generally what they have in mind. The more 
straightforward notion of such a contract envisions the land as 
changing hands only after the price is paid; until then, the 
seller still owns the land and the buyer is in the unfulfilled 
process of acquiring it.15 In order to understand why a 
legal doctrine such as equitable conversion could be 
acknowledged at all, when its effect is to transform realty 
into personalty, automatically and in disregard of the 
intention of the parties, a brief excursus into our legal 
history may be helpful. 
The English common law developed along the lines of certain 
specific "writs" issued by the king's courts to address certain 
specific wrongs. Pursuant to an early statute, problems that 
did not fit within the scope of an existing writ could not be 
remedied by the king's courts, although the courts in time 
became somewhat adept at stretching the scope of the prescribed 
writs by analogy.16 Still, many grievances, such as a simple 
breach of a contract, for example, were for centuries not 
effectively resolved by the rigid, stultified rules of the 
common law.1*7 
When relief was not available at common law for a perceived 
wrong, the aggrieved person at first petitioned the king . 
directly to intervene and do justice. The kings came to refer 
such petitions to their chancellors to be decided according to 
conscience and equity, rather than by the rigid rules of the 
common law. The chancellors eventually developed a system of 
courts, procedure, and substantive law separate from the common 
law, which came to be known by the word "equity." 
One of the remedies commonly employed by the courts of 
equity was specific performance, an order directing the 
defendant to perform a specific act in furtherance of a 
contractual obligation. In a contract for the sale of land, a 
recalcitrant seller could be ordered in equity to specifically 
15. 3A A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts 193-94 (1960). 
16. D. Dobbs, Remedies 28-35 (1978). 
17. Id.; L. Fuller & M. Eisenberg, Basic Contract Law 63-66 
(1972). 
perform the contract, that is, to actually convey the land. If 
he failed to do so, he could be penalized for contempt.18 
One of the time-honored maxims of equity was that it 
"regards as done that which ought to be done." Applying this 
maxim to land sale contracts came to mean that if specific 
performance could be granted on the contract, the contract 
could be considered as if it had been fully performed. The 
seller could therefore be treated as having conveyed the 
property and received the price, and the buyer as having 
received the property. The seller was therefore deemed in 
equity to hold personal property, and the buyer, real 
property. This deeming was, of course, a legal fiction; the 
contract was fully performed only in the chancellor's 
imagination. The reality was that a deed would be delivered 
and the seller would consider himself no longer the owner when 
the sale had been consummated by receipt of the full price.19 
When the English legal tradition was transplanted to 
America, the doctrine of equitable conversion came along with 
it. In 1905, the American legal scholar Christopher Columbus 
Langdell systematized it elaborately, and it almost seems as if 
Langdell placed his philosophical mark upon the doctrine, 
making it into a "legal geometry" or a "heaven of juristic 
conceptions."20 For Langdell, law was a science, whose data 
in the English tradition were the prior decisions of 
courts.21 To the legal scientist, cloistered in the library 
18. The earliest origins of equitable conversion have been 
traced to trust concepts, independent of specific performance. 
Davis, The Origin of the Doctrine of Equitable Conversion bv 
Contract 25 Ky. L.J. 58 (1936); Simpson, Legislative Changes in 
the Law of Eouitable Conversion by Contract, 44 Yale L.J. 559 
n.3 (1935). The current formulation of the doctrine, however, 
is firmly linked to the specific enforceability of the contract, 
perhaps due to the oft-cited formulation by Lord Eldon in a case 
seeking specific performance, Seton v. Slafle, 7 Ves. Jun. 265 
(1802). 
19. The fictional character of the rule is apparent in the fact 
that equity would not invoke it to give the purchaser any real 
incidents of ownership before the time set for performance. H. 
McClintock, McClintOCk on Equity 295 (1948). 
20. 3 American Law of Property 64 (Casner, ed., 1952). 
21. Address by C.C. Langdell delivered November 5, 1886, 
reprinted in Law Quarterly Review 123, 124 (1887). 
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that was his laboratory, it was irrelevant whether the rule 
extracted from the cases produced a result that was in reality 
unjust or at odds with common sense. What mattered was not 
whether the rule was a good one but rather whether -it was the 
rule.22 
This rather mechanistic, wholly abstract view of the law 
has fallen upon evil days in recent decades. Sociological 
jurisprudence and legal realism waged a war of commentary on 
the application of fixed rules without regard to fairness in an 
individual case or to social policy. In particular, equitable 
conversion came to be explained as a "name given to results 
reached on other grounds."23 No longer was it a set of. 
substantive rules describable in clauses beginning with "if" 
and "then"; rather, it was simply a shorthand method of 
describing what came after the "then." There was still little 
thought of adding an express "because .' . . ," or of explaining 
the reasons for either the substantive rule or the result in a 
specific case. 
This inattention to the reasons for equitable conversion 
led to some roundhouse critiques of the doctrine. Harlan Stone 
debunked it in a 1913 article.24 Several other writers also 
denounced, and uniform legislation was proposed to counteract, 
its effect of placing the risk of casualty loss on the buyer 
during the executory period.25 Some cases hedged in relying 
on the equitable conversion doctrine, declaring that it would 
22. For example, Langdell noted in his casebook on contracts 
that the "mailbox rule" holding that acceptance is effective on 
dispatch, regardless of whether it is received, had been criti-
cized as leading to unjust and absurd results. "The true 
answer" to that criticism was, according to Langdell, "that it 
is irrelevant." C.C. Langdell, A Selection of Cases on the Law 
of Contracts 995-96 (2d ed. 1879). 
23. Pound, The Progress of the Law, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 813, 832 
(1920); see also Stone, Equitable Conversion bv Contract, 13 
Colum. L. Rev. 369 (1913). 
24. stone, Equitable Conversion by Contract/ 13 Colum. L. Rev. 
369 (1913). 
25. E.g., Vannemann, Risk of Loss in Equity between the Date of 
Contract to Sell Real Estate and Transfer of Title, 8 Minn. L. 
Rev. (1924); Williston, The Risk of Loss After an Executory 
Contract of Sale in the Common Law, 9 Harv. L. Rev. 106 (1895). 
be invoked only when it led to a fair result,26 Contrary to 
the majority's claim, my thorough reading of the modern 
commentary on equitable conversion generally reveals little 
enthusiasm for universal application of the doctrine and no 
persuasive reasoning to support its application in this case. 
The scholarly criticism of the blind application of the 
doctrine of equitable conversion has, however, been only 
partially successful in preventing its misuse in the courts. 
Leading commentators have recently noted that "decisions [on 
equitable conversion] often seem adamant in their unwillingness 
to discuss the underlying policy issues; equitable conversion 
almost becomes a substitute for thinking about the real 
questions in the case/ 2 7 There is no justification for 
ignoring what is actually happening in a case and what the 
parties' clash of interests is really all about. Invoking a 
talisman such as "equitable conversion" tb give a name and 
ostensible legitimacy to a rule without a rationale is a 
jurisprudential cop-out, and exposes society to potential 
danger from rules that have drifted from their public policy 
moorings. In my opinion, courts have a responsibility to 
continually scrutinize the law we apply, particularly 
judicially-created law such as equitable conversion, in order 
to weed out defects in the law as it has been handed down to us 
and to keep it consistent with evolving social policy and 
conditions.28 
26. E.g., Clay v. Landreth, 187 Va. 169, 187 S.E.2d 875 (1948); 
In re Seifert's Estate, 109 N.H. 62, 242 A.2d 64, 33 A.L.R.3d 
1276 (1967); National Bank of Topeka v. Saia. 154 Kan. 739, 121 
P.2d 251 (1942) '. 
27. R. Cunningham, W, Stoebuck & D. Whitman, The Law of 
Property 699 (1984). 
28. See Hackford v. Utah Power & Light Co., 740 P.2d 1281, 
1285-86 (Utah 1987); B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial 
process 98-142 (1921). Holmes expressed both the compunctions 
and the necessity felt by a person who must discharge this 
responsibility in saying that he "hesitate|[s] to affirm 
universal validity for his social ideals" and "may be ready to 
admit that he knows nothing about an absolute best in the 
cosmos, and even that he knows next to nothing about a permanent 
best for men. Still it is true that a body of law is more 
rational and more civilized when every rule it contains is 
referred articulately and definitely to an end which it 
subserves, and when the grounds for desiring that end are stated 
or are ready to be stated in words." Holmes, The Path of the 
LaH, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 468-69 (1897). 
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Viewing the policies and practical reasons for equitable 
conversion, I firmly believe that it is not a rule that should 
be applied as a matter of course in every instance- Rather, it 
describes a result in which the seller's interest is deemed to 
be essentially personalty and the buyer's interest to be 
realty. In reaching that result, the court should endeavor, as 
with any contract, to give effect to the reasonable 
expectations of the parties,29 While applying equitable 
conversion automatically for every question involving a land 
sale contract may foster easy predictability, it would 
nevertheless in many instances disregard or frustrate what the 
parties intended their contract to accomplish, which is a 
transfer of property when it is paid for, but not before. The 
contract in this case, for example, clearly contemplates a 
transfer of ownership by deed after all installments have been 
paid. 
One involuntary consequence30 of the seller's retention 
of title to the property is that his creditors may reach it in 
satisfaction of their claims against him. Enabling creditors 
to have access to the seller's title to the property is thought 
by the majority to lessen the predictability of real estate 
transactions. However, a prudent buyer can still assure his 
title by checking the judgment docket to determine if 
creditors' claims exist. In this and most sales, the buyer has 
recourse against the seller if title is encumbered, and, if the 
encumbrance is serious, may rescind the sale..31 If, however, 
29. 1 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts 1-3 (1963); see 9lSQ John 
Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205, 1207 
(Utah 1987); Lundstrom v. Radio Corp. of Am., 17 Utah 2d 114, 
405 P.2d 339 (1965); Carlson v. Hamilton, 8 Utah 2d 272, 332 
P.2d 989 (1958). 
30. We recognize that the buyer and seller in this case, like 
most, probably did not intend for a judgment lien to attach to 
the seller's interest shortly before the seller conveyed to the 
buyer, and they would have precluded the lien, if that were 
possible. However, the law also recognizes the rights of a 
party's creditors to reach assets in satisfaction of their 
judgments, without regard to the debtor's preferences in the 
matter. Therefore, once it is clear that they have, by their 
intent, retained a property interest, the rights of creditors to 
reach that interest operate without regard to what the 
debtor-promisor and his promisee may have intended.. 
31. Barastrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123 (Utah 1984); Callister v. 
Millstream Assocs.. Inc., 738 P.2d 662 (Utah App. 1987). 
the buyer ignores the encumbrance, he proceeds at his peril, 
unless he can prove himself to be a bona fide purchaser or 
invoke statutory protection such as the recording act.32 
Neither Hodge nor the Cannefaxes attempted to rescind, or 
asserted that they are bona fide purchasers or protected under 
the recording act. In these circumstances, there is nothing 
wrong with leaving the loss to fall upon the buyer, who is able 
to discover in advance the faults in the title and take 
corrective action. 
In determining the legal effect of a contract, therefore, 
the intent of the parties33 should carry far more weight than 
a legal fiction, however deep in tradition the fiction's 
roots. People have a right to make contracts and to have their 
lawful contractual intentions fulfilled, and they cannot fairly 
be expected to make contracts with a thorough knowledge of the 
oblique way in which 'nine centuries of equitable jurisprudence 
may twist and "convert" the meaning of their intentions.34 
In holding that the buyer's and seller's interests are 
equitably converted, the majority is oblivious to the face of 
the contract itself, which provides that the seller will convey 
the real property when the price is received, and not before. 
It was undisputed that the price was not received when the 
Clements' judgment was docketed. 
In my view, the majority also places Insufficient value in 
the need to efficiently enforce judgments. They intimate that 
the Clements could have executed on their judgment, but ignore 
the fact that their execution was judicially restrained in this 
case. It is also unclear in Utah law that the Clements have 
anything on which they could execute, without a judgment lien. 
At common law, execution cannot be levied on a chose in 
action,35 and, although that common law rule has been changed 
by statute in many jurisdictions, there is no applicable Utah 
32. See Greoerson v. Jensen. 669 P.2d 396, 398-99 (Utah 1983). 
33. Contrary to the majority's view, the intent of the parties 
is clear from the face of their contract, and, under the parol 
evidence rule, extrinsic evidence is unnecessary and 
inadmissible.< Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. 
Blomquistr 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). 
34. Other equitable doctrines, such as estoppel, laches, 
unclean hands, etc. are not subject to this same criticism. 
Rather, they serve to carry into effect the fair and reasonable 
intentions of the parties. 
35. 33 C.J.S. Executions § 28 at 158-59 (1942). 
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statute. Thus, by reducing the seller's interest to a mere 
contract receivable, the majority leaves the judgment creditor 
without a clear, sure means of reaching the seller's contract 
interest under our law, other than by garnishing each payment 
as it accrues. Enforcing a duly entered judgment thus becomes 
a cumbersome process of having a writ issued and served before 
each installment is paid. 
Most jurisdictions that have considered this question have 
weighed the policy considerations as I do. Contrary to the 
assertion of the majority, the scholars studying this question 
all conclude that the majority of jurisdictions hold that a 
judgment lien attaches to the seller's interest in a contract 
for the sale of real property.36 
More persuasive, however, than the results of any 
interstate judicial poll are the compelling needs to recognize 
the parties' contractual intent and to provide an effective 
means of enforcing judgments. Conversely, there is no real 
reason favoring equitable conversion in this setting, other 
than perhaps a wish for abstract symmetry or eleaantia juris, 
which could incline one to the notion that, since the buyer has 
real property under equitable conversion principles, the seller 
must conversely have personal property for all purposes, 
including the attachment of judgment liens.27 However, to 
36. E,g,, Monroe v. Lincoln Citv Employees Credit Union, 203 
Neb. 702, 279 N.W.2d 866 (1979); First Security Bank v. Rogers, 
91 Idaho 654, 429 P.2d 386 (1967); Heider v. Deitz, 234 P.2d 
105, 429 P.2d 386 (1967). Surveys of case law on point include 
R. Cunningham, W. Stoebuck & D. Whitman, The Law of Property 701 
(1984); Lacy, Creditors of Land Contract Vendors, 24 Case W. 
Res. L. Rev. 645, 646 (1973); 3 Am. Law of Property 11.29 at 85 
(1952). 
37. It is perhaps ironic that equity, which began as an effort 
to overcome the constricting formalism of the common law writ 
system, came to have such a penchant for wholly abstract logical 
symmetry. Some of this devotion to abstract symmetry has already 
been discarded; the old equitable doctrine of mutuality of 
remedy, for example, which held that an equitable remedy could 
be granted to the plaintiff only if the defendant, under like, 
hypothetical circumstances, could obtain the same remedy, has 
been totally discarded. Utah Mercnr Gold Mining Co. v. Herschel 
fiolrt Mining Co. , 103 Utah 249, 134 P.2d 1094, 1097 (1943) ("The 
remedy of one should not depend upon the hypothetical case of 
what another could demand if the situation were different."); 
ftennla Town v. Sanfcaquin City- 96 Utah 88, 80 P.2d 930, 934 
(1938). 
give way to such a wish in disregard of the parties* intent and 
of the need to enforce lawful judgments is sheer formalism, a 
glorification of abstraction for abstraction's sake. 
Potential Defenses Not Raised 
The Cannefaxes' position here and in the district court 
has consisted only of an attempt to invok^ equitable conversion 
to prevent the Clements' judgment lien from attaching. The 
Cannefaxes have not asserted any defenses against the 
enforcement of the Clements' lien, once it attached. 
Ordinarily, there would be little need to mention defenses 
never raised by the parties, but in this case, I believe the 
majority has, in effect, given some weight to those potential 
defenses. They presume, for example, that the Cannefaxes are 
bona fide purchasers, and they also view the Clements as having 
failed to perform a duty to give actual notice to the 
Cannefaxes, in order to "perfect," in a sense, their lien 
against the Cannefaxes. However, the Cannefaxes' bona fides 
and lack of actual notice are unproven facts that might have 
been material to defensive arguments that were never raised. 
Since the Cannefaxes had the burden of avoiding the lien in 
order to quiet title,38 judgment against them is correct, 
even though there was no apparent inquiry into either actual 
notice, the Cannefaxes* knowledge of the judgment or lack of 
it, or into their bona fides in any respedt. 
As the majority also points out, several jurisdictions 
have held that the judgment lienor cannot recover from the 
buyer any installment payments made in the ordinary course of 
contract performance without actual noticd of the existence of 
the judgment lien.39 These holdings are rooted in concern 
that the buyer not be required to check the judgment docket 
every time an installment payment is made; such would be an 
38. Olsen v. Park Daughters Inv. Co., 29 Utah 2d 421, 511 P.2d 
145 (1973). 
39. Mav v. Emerson, 52 Ore. 262, 96 P. 454 (1908); Wehn v. 
Fall, 55 Neb. 547, 76 N.W. 13 (1898); &££ R. Cunningham, W. 
Stoebuck & D. Whitman, The Law of Property 702 (1982); Lacy, 
Creditors of Land Contract Vendors. 24 Case W. Res. L. Rev. at 
646-47; A. Freeman & E. Tuttle, A Treatise on the Law of 
Judgments 965 (5th ed. 1905). 
flonooo.ra no 
-intolerable inconvenience."40 Instead, the buyer is 
permitted to continue paying installments, which are credited 
against the price, until the buyer is given actual, not merely 
constructive, notice of the lien. I have no quarrel with such 
a conclusion, but there is absolutely no occasion to reach it 
in this case, since there is no indication in the stipulated 
facts whether or not the Cannefaxes had actual notice of the 
lien at a time when they could have averted consummation of the 
sale. The Cannefaxes, in seeking to quiet title against the 
Clements, had the burden of going forward with evidence showing 
that the lien was unenforceable.41 All section 78-22-1 
requires for a lien to attach is entry of the judgment and 
docketing in the proper county. The judgment creditor is not 
required to do anything more, such as give actual notice to a 
contract buyer, and to require more would run contrary to 
section 78-22-1.42 
40. Moyer v. Hinman, 13 N.Y. 180 (1855). Such concern 
certainly has its place in adjudication, and Utah case law has 
recognized that simple fairness and "the equities" may properly 
be considered in reaching a decision. Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 
P.2d 156, 158 (Utah 1976); but see Briaas v. Liddell, 699 P.2d 
770, 772 (Utah 1985) ("equitable powers are narrowly bounded"). 
However, an unstructured, unguided inquiry.into "whatever's 
fair" invites subjectivity and inconsistent, uncertain results, 
and the often elusive and ethereal nature of "fairness" would 
leave little effective means, other than litigation, for 
resolving disputes. I would therefore prefer to see such 
equitable concern take a more structured form, such as laches. 
Under that doctrine, a lienor would be barred from enforcing the 
lien if the lienor delayed in asserting his rights while his 
adversary performed reasonably and innocently to his detriment. 
See Borland v. Chandler. 733 P.2d 144 (Utah 1987). 
41. Olsen v. Park Daughters Inv. Co.. 511 P.2d at 146. There 
are several other potential arguments which, in an appropriate 
factual setting, the buyer could have asserted against the 
lien. However, we have neither facts nor argument to enable us 
to determine, for example, whether the title company handling 
the closing was negligent and could have reversed the 
transaction by returning escrowed deeds and money when it 
learned of the lien, or whether the Clements1 lien is inferior 
in priority to the interests of Hodge and the Cannefaxes. 
42. Taylor Nat'l, Inc. v. Jensen Bros. Constr. Co., 641 P.2d 
150, 154-55 (Utah 1982). 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, I believe there is no question but that the 
buyer's interest in an executory land sale contract may be 
characterized as real property under the fiction of equitable 
conversion for the purpose of the attachment of the buyer's 
judgment creditors' liens. However, the cases, including 
Butler, do not hold that because the buver's interest may be 
considered real property for that purpose, it must then 
necessarily follow that the seller's retained title is 
personalty to which the liens of the seller's judgment 
creditors cannot attach. 
In my opinion, the rule to be deduced from Butler and the 
cases cited therein is that the seller's retained title in an 
installment land sale contract was, is, and remains real 
property to the extent of the unpaid balance of the purchase 
price for the purposes of the attachment of liens of the 
seller's judgment creditors. Further, by reason of the fiction 
of equitable conversion, the buyer's interest may also be 
characterized as real property, limited only by the right of 
the seller to receive the purchase price and the performance of 
other, terms of the contract. 
I recognize that the recording statutes and bona fide 
purchaser considerations are significant and may be overriding 
in a given case.43 However, no such matters appear from the 
stipulated facts in this case and none were raised or argued in 
the district court or here on appeal. 
From the cases, as well as an examination of the 
historical underpinnings of the equitable conversion fiction, 
which is not a doctrine of universal application, I am 
regrettably compelled to respectfully disagree with the 
mMOEity's opinion, and I. would affirm the trial court. 
ifi. Robert Bullock, Judge 
43. Euilej:, 740 P.2d 1259-60. 
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